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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a new theoretical framework of pyramid Markov processes
to solve some open and fundamental problems of blockchain selfish mining under
a rigorously mathematical setting. To this end, we first describe a more general
blockchain selfish mining with both a two-block leading competitive criterion and
a new economic incentive, and establish a pyramid Markov process to express the
dynamic behavior of the selfish mining from both consensus protocol and economic
incentive. Then we show that the pyramid Markov process is stable and so is the
blockchain, and its stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric with an explicitly
representable rate matrix. Furthermore, we use the stationary probability vector to be
able to analyze the waste of computational resource due to generating a lot of orphan
(or stale) blocks. Nextly, we set up a pyramid Markov reward process to investigate
the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively.
Specifically, we show that the long-run average profits are multivariate linear such that
we can measure the improvement of mining efficiency of the dishonest mining pool
comparing to the honest mining pool. As a by-product, we build three approximative
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Markov processes, related to the pyramid Markov process, when the system states
are described as the block-number difference of two forked block branches. Also, by
using their special cases with non network latency, we can further provide some useful
interpretation for both the Markov chain (Figure 1) and the revenue analysis ((1) to
(3)) of the seminal work by Eyal and Sirer (2014). Finally, we use some numerical
examples to verify the correctness and computability of our theoretical results. Note
that the pyramid Markov (reward) processes can be applied to open a new avenue
in the study of blockchain selfish mining from a perspective of normative computing,
thus we hope that the methodology and results developed in this paper shed light on
the blockchain selfish mining such that a series of promising research can be produced
potentially.
Keywords: Bitcoin; blockchain; selfish mining; forked structure; consensus pro-
tocol; Proof of Work (PoW); pyramid Markov process; Markov reward process; phase-
type (PH) distribution; Matrix-geometric solution.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin has received tremendous attentions as the first fully decentralized distributed cryp-
tocurrency since its advent by Satoshi Nakamoto [71] in 2008. Blockchain is used to se-
curely record a public shared ledger of Bitcoin payment transactions among Internet users
in an open P2P network. In the past decade, we have witnessed the explosive growth of
blockchain, as exemplified by Bitcoin (2008), Ethereum and smart contract (2013), Hyper-
ledger Fabric (2015), Libra (Facebook 2019) and so on. The great success of blockchain,
together with Bitcoin, is based on solving the cryptographic puzzle by the brute force,
namely Proof of Work (PoW). Note that the PoW is a most frequently used consensus
protocol (or algorithm). In addition, an economic incentive in Bitcoins is designed for
a lot of miners according to the share proportion of their corresponding computational
powers in solving the cryptographic puzzle. Based on this, Satoshi Nakamoto [71] showed
a key Bitcoin (blockchain) characteristic: The fairness of PoW, i.e., as long as more than
50% of the mining power follows the PoW, the probability that a honest miner can earn
the block reward and the transaction fee is proportional to his computational power.
In 2014, a seminal work was given by Eyal and Sirer [23] (nearly at the same time,
Bahack [3]), they first introduced an important concept: selfish mining. Since then, the
method of Eyal and Sirer [23] has been applied more and more in the literature in order
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to discuss the blockchain selfish mining, for example, multiple mining pools, Ethereum
(and smart contract), and so on. Readers may refer to, for example, stubborn mining by
Nayak et al. [74], Wang et al. [91] and Liu et al. [62], Ethereum (and smart contract)
by Niu and Feng [77], multiple mining pools (or miners) by Liu et al. [60] and Jain [39],
multi-stage blockchain by Chang et al.[13].
Eyal and Sirer [23] gave a key finding of the blockchain selfish mining: The fairness of
Bitcoin PoW can be destroyed by the selfish mining attacks, i.e., the selfish mining pool
keeps secretly withholding blocks not to broadcast in the open P2P network if the number
of blocks mined by the selfish mining pool remains ahead of the others. In this case, the
selfish mining pool continues to mine on the top of the selfish-mining block branch such
that the selfish mining pool can earn his unfair more amount of mining profit.
When there exist more than one mining pools in blockchain, it is possible that no less
than two blocks can be produced and pegged on a preceding block (parent block) such
that they can form several block branches forked at a tree root. This leads to a forked
structure starting from the parent block, as the length (or height) of blockchain increases.
For such a forked structure, readers may refer to Section 4 of Eyal and Sirer [23] for some
examples. On the other hand, to enhance the scalability and transaction throughput of
blockchain, Sompolinsky and Zohar [86] generalized the simple forked tree (i.e., several
block branches forked at a tree root), to a more general tree with multiple branching points
(a multinode tree, GHOST), and further to a Direct Acyclic Graph (abbreviated DAG)
by Kiayias and Panagiotakos [47]. In addition, readers may also refer to Lee [50] and Choi
et al. [16] for more details. It is interesting but difficult and challenging to study the
blockchain selfish mining with multiple mining pools, which form such a forked structure,
for example, several block branches forked at a tree root, a multinode tree (GHOST), and
DAG.
Differently from those works in the literature, this paper provides a rigorously mathe-
matical re-thinking for the Markov chain (Figure 1) and the revenue analysis ((1) to (3))
of Eyal and Sirer [23] by means of our new pyramid Markov process. Also see Sections
8 and 9 of this paper. Following the idea of of Eyal and Sirer [23], we establishes three
approximative Markov processes, coming from our pyramid Markov process (Figure 2),
when the system states are described as the block-number difference of two forked block
branches. Furthermore, by using their special cases with non network latency, we can
further explain what the Markov chain (Figure 1) and the revenue analysis ((1) to (3)) of
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Eyal and Sirer [23] should be under the theory of Markov (reward) processes. Also see Li
[56] for more details.
Now, we carefully check the Markov chain (Figure 1) and the revenue analysis ((1) to
(3)) of Eyal and Sirer [23]. To this end, we raise three basic questions to discuss as follows:
(a) What are the boundary states: 0 and 0′? (b) How is the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ
formed? (c) Can the states 2, 3, 4, . . .exist in the Markov chain (Figure 1) of Eyal and Sirer
[23]? For Questions (a) and (b), Sections 7 and 8 of this paper establish three approximate
Markov processes by means of a black-box state (0, 0), which condenses some lower levels
of the pyramid Markov process (Figure 3). It is easy to see that the sojourn time at the
black-box state (0, 0) is non-exponential by using a PH distribution of infinite sizes. In
addition, it is also observed that the black-box state (0, 0) is state 0 of Eyal and Sirer [23];
while our state 0 (i.,e., 0 = k− k for k ≥ 1) is state 0′ of Eyal and Sirer [23]. In fact, from
Figure 8 of this paper, we don’t know in any way how to be able to generate states 0 and
0′ of Eyal and Sirer [23] by using theory of Markov processes. On the other hand, the
sojourn times at states 0 and 0′ of Eyal and Sirer [23] may not be exponential, and the state
transition probability (or rate) from state 0′ to state 0 should not be any of the three path-
separated values: α, γ (1− α) and (1− γ) (1− α), while 1 is really the state transition
probability from state 0′ to state 0, since α + γ (1− α) + (1− γ) (1− α) = 1. Even so,
from theory of Markov processes, the three path-separated probabilities: α, γ (1− α) and
(1− γ) (1− α) can not individually appear in the state transition from state 0′ to state
0 because the three path-separated probabilities are designed by an artificially subjective
choice. Furthermore, the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ does not exist in the Markov chain,
so that it does not play any role in analysis of the Markov chain, for instance, it has
nothing to do with the stationary probability vector of the Markov chain. For Question
(c), our three approximate Markov processes, given in Figure 9, show that there do not
exist those states 2, 3, 4, . . ., unless a block-detained probability sequence is introduced, as
seen in Figures 8 and 9 for a more intuitive understanding. Therefore, this paper explains
what the Markov chain (Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23]) should be in reality.
Here, this paper provides some useful remarks on revenue (or profit) analysis of
blockchain selfish mining. Note that the first revenue analysis was given in (1) to (3)
of Eyal and Sirer [23] by means of the law of total probability, where from Eyal and Sirer
[23], its event probabilities are determined by using the Markov chain (Figure 1), and its
event revenue is derived in (1) and (2) by means of discussing those reward cases from (a)
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to (h). Since the stationary probability vector of the Markov chain (Figure 1 of Eyal and
Sirer [23]) is independent of the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ, the selfish mining pool’s
revenue function ((1) to (3) of Eyal and Sirer [23]) can linearly depend on the Eyal and
Sirer’s parameter γ only from its event revenue. On the other hand, from Sections 7 and
8 of this paper, it is easy to see that the selfish mining pool’s revenue function ((3) of Eyal
and Sirer [23]) is not based on a rigorously mathematical calculation. See Chapter 10 of
Li [56] for analysis of Markov reward processes. To our best knowledge, so far no work has
yet been developed to give a rigorous revenue analysis of the blockchain selfish mining.
To fill the rigorously mathematical gap, this paper sets up a pyramid Markov reward pro-
cess such that a new expression of revenue function is given by using the Markov reward
processes. Therefore, our revenue computation (Section 5 of this paper) can provide new
insights on understanding the revenue analysis: (1) to (3) of Eyal and Sirer [23] from a
different perspective.
It is a core task to design the block-leading number (i.e., difference of two block-
numbers) between the two forked block branches. Eyal and Sirer [23] used a two-block
leading competitive criterion, while Go˝bel et al. [31] studied an one-block leading compet-
itive criterion. In this case, Go˝bel et al. [31] gave a key advance in the study of blockchain
selfish mining by means of adding the network propagation delay. They established a
two-dimensional Markov chain with two types of exponential block arrivals from the two
mining pools respectively and with one exponential network propagation delay, e.g., see
(15) to (19) of Go˝bel et al. [31] for more details. For the two-dimensional Markov chain,
Go˝bel et al. [31] provided an effective method to explicitly express its stationary proba-
bility vector. Also, Javier and Fralix [41] further proposed a new computational technique
to derivate the stationary probability vector. Differently from Go˝bel et al. [31] and Javier
and Fralix [41], for computing the stationary probability vector this paper provides a new
matrix-geometric solution, which has an explicitly representable rate matrix. Therefore,
this paper provides a unified theoretical framework of pyramid Markov processes, which is
applicable to a wide range of blockchain selfish mining by means of the matrix-geometric
solution.
On the other hand, from Figures 8 and 9 of this paper, we realize that the model
assumptions of Go˝bel et al. [31] did not provide an adequate support on the key selfish
behavior of the dishonest mining pool, for example, how will such a selfish behavior be
taken from either one small mining pool or the other big mining pool, since the two
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different mining pools have almost all the common factors. In addition, Figure 9 of this
paper further demonstrates that if the network propagation delay becomes zero, then
the withholding block process in Go˝bel et al. [31] will immediately disappear. This
leads to that all the dishonest miners become the honest miners such that the selfish
behavior disappear completely. To strengthen the selfish behavior of the dishonest mining
pool, this paper provides a major modification of the model assumptions of Go˝bel et
al. [31] through introducing not only a two-block leading competitive criterion but also
an economic incentive mechanism, both of which come from some actual motivations of
blockchain selfish mining based on three basic factors: The efficiency-increased ratio ℜ,
the mining rate γ of jumping miners from the honest mining pool to the dishonest mining
pool (the jumping’s mining rate, in short), and a block-detained probability sequence
{pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .}. Note that the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ measures the improved
degree of mining efficiency of the dishonest mining pool; the jumping’s mining rate γ
denotes the social reputation and influence of the dishonest mining pool; and the block-
detained probability sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .} denotes the selfish attack policy of the
dishonest mining pool. Therefore, this paper uses the three basic factors to be adaptable
to various actual circumstance of blockchain selfish mining.
It is a key research to analyze the orphan blocks of blockchain selfish mining and their
influence on the waste of computing resource of blockchain. For qualitative analysis of
orphan blocks, readers may refer to, such as Carlsten et al. [12], Velner et al. [89], Stifter
et al. [87], Saad et al. [81] and Awe et al. [1]. However, so far none of previous works has
developed an effective method to analyze the orphan blocks of blockchain selfish mining.
To this end, this paper sets up a pyramid Markov process and use its stationary probability
vector to provide a detailed quantitative analysis for the orphan blocks of blockchain selfish
mining.
Finally, this paper sets up a pyramid Markov reward process such that our revenue
analysis is expressed as the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining
pools, respectively. Based on this, this paper further shows that the long-run average
profits are multivariate linear such that we can establish a sufficient condition under
which the blockchain is operate normally. Moreover, we can measure the mining efficiency
of the dishonest mining pool comparing to the honest mining pool by means of the long-
run average profits. Therefore, this paper develops a theoretical framework of pyramid
Markov (reward) processes to open a new avenue to a lot of potential promising research
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of blockchain selfish mining. We hope that the methodology and results developed in this
paper can shed light on the blockchain selfish mining and find a series of fundamental
results.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
1. We describe a more general blockchain selfish mining with both a two-block leading
competitive criterion and a new economic incentive, both of which are described as
three key factors: The efficiency-increased ratio ℜ, the jumping’s mining rate γ, and
a block-detained probability sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .}. (Section 2)
2. We set up a pyramid Markov process to express the dynamics of the blockchain
selfish mining. Further, we show that the pyramid Markov process is stable and so
is the blockchain, and its stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric with an
explicitly representable rate matrix. (Section 3)
3. We use the stationary probability vector to provide an effective method to analyze
the orphan blocks and their influence on the waste of computational resource of
blockchain selfish mining. (Section 4)
4. We establish a pyramid Markov reward process to investigate the long-run average
profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. Also, we show that
the long-run average profits are multivariate linear such that we can establish a
sufficient condition under which the blockchain operates normally. Moreover, we
can measure the mining efficiency of the dishonest mining pool. (Section 5)
5. We study the transient mining profits in the time interval [0, t) by means of the
PH distribution of infinite sizes and its associated PH renewal process. To our best
knowledge, this paper is the first one to provide the transient mining profits in the
study of blockchain selfish mining. (Section 6)
6. We build three approximative Markov processes, coming from the pyramid Markov
process, when the system states are taken as the block-number difference of two
forked branches. (Section 7). Further, we discuss a special case with no network
latency. Specifically, we use the three approximative Markov processes to provide
a detailed interpretation on not only the Markov chain and the revenue analysis of
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Eyal and Sirer [23], but also the two-dimensional Markov chain of Go˝bel et al. [31].
(Section 8)
In addition, we use some numerical examples to verify the correctness and computabil-
ity of our theoretical results in Section 9. We provide a relevant literature in Section 10.
Finally, Section 11 provides some useful concluding remarks.
2 Model Description
In this section, we describe a more general blockchain selfish mining with two different
mining pools, where one is the dishonest mining pool; while the other is the honest mining
pool, which may be regarded as a virtual pool with all the honest miners. The blockchain
selfish mining is controlled by not only a two-block leading competitive criterion but also
an economic incentive mechanism, both of which are described as three key parameters:
The efficiency-increased ratio ℜ, the jumping’s mining rate γ, and the block-detained
probability sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .}. Also, we introduce some mathematical notation
used in our later study.
In the blockchain selfish mining, the honest and dishonest mining pools have a fierce
competition on finding the nonces (solving the cryptographic puzzle) to generate the
blocks, each of which is successively published one top of two block branches forked at a
tree root. For several block branches forked at a tree root, the longest block branch in the
forked structure is called the main chain, while the others are called the chain of orphan
blocks.
To avoid the 51% atacks, we assume that the computational power of the honest
mining pool is more than half of the total computational power of the blockchain, that
is, the honest miners are in the majority, and the dishonest miners are in the minority.
The honest mining pool follows the two-block leading competitive criterion, while the
dishonest mining pool follows the selfish mining attack strategy, which is a modification
of the two-block leading competitive criterion by means of the block-detained probability
sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .}, please refer to Figure 3 for an intuitive understanding.
In the blockchain, every external transaction first needs to be checked by using a certain
handling expense (called the fee of a transaction). Then it is sent to the transaction pool,
from which some transactions are randomly taken to generate some blocks by one of the
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honest and dishonest mining pools, e.g., see Li et al. [57, 58] for an intuitive interpretation.
On the other hand, the transactions of an orphan block are returned to the transaction
pool but no additional transaction fee is required again. For convenience of analysis, we
assume that the transaction pool always has a large enough capacity.
In what follows, we provide some more detailed model descriptions of the blockchain
selfish mining as follows.
(1) Block-generating processes: We assume that the blocks mined by the dishonest
and honest pools have formed two block branches forked a tree root, and the growths of
the two block branches are two Poisson processes with block-generating rates α > 0 and
β > 0, where α = α˜ (1 + ℜ), ℜ ≥ 0 is the efficiency-increased ratio of the dishonest mining
pool; and α˜ > 0 is regarded as a net mining rate when all the miners of the dishonest pool
become honest, β is a net mining rate corresponding to the honest mining pool.
(2) The jumping’s mining rate: The dishonest mining pool has more mining
advantages than the honest mining pool, so it will attract some honest miners who jump
into the dishonest pool from the honest pool. Let γ be the net jumping’s mining rate, then
the block-generating rates of the dishonest and honest pools are given by (α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ)
(i.e., α+ γ (1 + ℜ)) and β − γ, respectively.
To overcome the 51% attacks, it is necessary to limit the jumping’s mining rate γ. Let
α˜+ γ < (1/2) (α˜+ β) and β − γ > (1/2) (α˜+ β). Then we obtain
0 ≤ γ <
1
2
(β − α˜) . (1)
From a more practical economic perspective, the two key parameters ℜ and γ are
well related to the dishonest pool’s operations management level, social reputation and
influence, the reward of each excavated block, and so on. Clearly, this paper is different
from those works in the literature. See Figure 1 for our blockchain system with the two
honest and dishonest mining pools.
(3) Network latency: The network latency always make some time delay for each
block pegged on the blockchain. The time length of a block pegged on the blockchain
is called a block-pegged time. It is easy to see that the network delay is a time interval
that begins with the broadcast time of a block until it is pegged on the blockchain. In
general, the block-pegged time contains two different parts: The block broadcast time,
and the verification time by various miners. Currently, the block broadcast time is longer
than the verification time, because the verification time is very short. We assume that the
9
$GLVKRQHVW PLQLQJSRRO $KRQHVW PLQLQJSRRO
-XPSLQJ
PLQHUV
7KHHIILFLHQF\LQFUHDVHGUDWLR ႥFDQEHFKDQJHGDQGLQIOXHQFHGE\VRPHGLIIHUHQWIDFWRUVRIWKHGLVKRQHVW
SRROIRUH[DPSOHPLQLQJDELOLW\OHYHORIRSHUDWLRQVPDQDJHPHQWDQGVRFLDOLPSDFW
7KHPLQLQJUDWH ȖRIMXPSLQJPLQHUVFDQEHFKDQJHGDQGLQIOXHQFHGE\VRPHGLIIHUHQWIDFWRUVIRUH[DPSOH
WKHUHZDUGRIHDFKH[FDYDWHGEORFNDQGWKHPLQLQJDELOLW\DQGVRFLDOLPSDFWRIWKHGLVKRQHVWSRRO
7KHGLVKRQHVWPLQLQJUDWH 7KHKRQHVWPLQLQJUDWH
Figure 1: A blockchain system with two different mining pools
block-pegged times are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), and each of them
is exponential with mean 1/µ.
Since an orphan block can not be pegged on the blockchain, it has to be returned to
the transaction pool after an exponential time of duration with mean 1/µ.
(4) A two-block leading competitive criterion: When a cryptographic puzzled
problem is solved to find a nonce, a new block is pegged on one top of two block branches
forked a tree root. Now, we introduce a two-block leading competitive criterion as follows:
(a) The main chain by the honest pool. Once the honest chain of blocks is two blocks
ahead of the dishonest chain of blocks, then the honest chain of blocks is taken as the
main chain. In this case, the two forked block branches ends immediately, the main chain,
as a whole, is pegged on the blockchain. At the same time, all the blocks of the dishonest
chain immediately becomes orphan blocks, and all of them are returned to the transaction
pool without any new fee.
(b) The main chain by the dishonest pool. Once the dishonest chain of blocks is k
blocks ahead of the honest chain of blocks for k ≥ 2, then the dishonest chain of blocks is
taken as the main chain. In this case, either the main chain is pegged on the blockchain
with probability pk, such that the forked process of two block branches ends immediately,
or the dishonest miners continue to mine more blocks to extend this chain with probability
1− pk. Also, all the blocks of the honest chain immediately becomes orphan blocks, and
each of them is returned to the transaction pool.
Note that with probability 1− pk, the dishonest pool does not broadcast these mined
10
blocks such that it can keep continuing to mine more blocks. To make that the dishonest
pool can get more reward of blocks, we assume that limn→∞ pn = 1.
To understand the two-block leading competitive criterion, we take a simple example,
depicted in Figure 2, to show the evolutionary block branches in such a forked structure.
"
WLPH
"
"
"
" "
$FFHSWWKHKRQHVWPLQLQJEORFNVDVWKHPDLQFKDLQ $FFHSWWKHGLVKRQHVWPLQLQJEORFNVDVWKHPDLQFKDLQ
$IRUNDWWDFNEHJLQV
$JHQHVLVEORFN
$IRUNDWWDFNEHJLQV
$EORFNRQWKHORQJHVWRUPDLQFKDLQ $EORFNLVPLQHGE\WKHGLVKRQHVWSRRO
7KHGLVKRQHVWPLQLQJUDWH
$EORFNLVPLQHGE\WKHKRQHVWSRRO
7KHKRQHVWPLQLQJUDWH
$OHDGLQJWZRFRPSHWLWLYHFULWHULRQ
$OHDGLQJWZRFRPSHWLWLYHFULWHULRQ
"
Figure 2: The blockchain with a forked structure of two block branches
Remark 1 (a) If limn→∞ pn = 1, then the main chain by the dishonest pool must be
pegged on the blockchain. (b) If limn→∞ pn < 1, then with probability 1− limn→∞ pn, the
dishonest pool does not broadcast the mined blocks so that some main chains will become
the chain of orphan blocks. This case is impractical from the mining purpose. Thus this
paper will not consider the case with limn→∞ pn < 1.
(5) The blockchain-pegged rule of the main chain: Once a main chain is formed,
then the mining provesses on the two block branches forked a tree root are terminated
immediately. The whole main chain is pegged on the blockchain, and the blockchain-
pegged times are i.i.d. and exponential with mean 1/µ. No new block can be generated
during the blockchain-pegged process of the main chain. Once the main chain is pegged on
the blockchain, then a new mining competition is immediately started on two new block
branches forked a tree root.
Remark 2 If some new blocks are generated during the blockchain-pegged process of the
main chain, then the main chain could be changed to the chain of orphan blocks. In this
case, we can’t tell who the final main chain is so that the blockchain-pegged rule and its
corresponding operation are very confusing.
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(6) Reward of generating a block pegged on the blockchain: Once a block is
generated and pegged on the blockchain, then the mining pool of generating this block
can obtain an appropriate amount of reward (or compensation) from two different parts:
(a) A block reward rB by the blockchain system. When a block is generated and pegged
on the blockchain, a mining pool will receive a certain amount of block reward rB .
(b) An average total transaction fee rF in the block. Although the transactions and
their number contained in the blocks are possibly different of each other, for the sake of
simplicity we take an average total transaction fee rF of the block.
Obviously, rB + rF is the total reward of generating a block and pegging it on the
blockchain.
For any orphan block, its mining pool will not receive any block reward or transaction
fee.
(7) The mining cost: Note that the mining cost of the blockchain system contains
two parts:
(a) The electric charge. Let cE be the electric price per unit of net mining rate and
per unit time. It is easy to see that the electric costs per unit time with respect to the
dishonest and honest pools are given by cE (α˜+ γ) and cE (β − γ), respectively.
(b) The administrative fee. Let cA be the administrative price per unit of real mining
rate and per unit time. Then the administrative costs per unit time with respect to the
dishonest and honest pools are given by cA (α˜+ γ) (1 +ℜ) and cA (β − γ), respectively.
Independence: We assume that all the random variables defined above are indepen-
dent of each other.
In what follows we provide some useful remarks for the model descriptions.
Remark 3 (a) Note that such a block reward is halved after every 210, 000 blocks are
mined. In November 2012, the block reward was reduced from its initial level of 50 Bitcoins
to 25 Bitcoins, the reduced reward of 12.5 was further done in July 2016, and then again
in July 2020 to its current level of 6.25. Finally, the block reward will be reduced 32 more
times before eventually reaching zero sometime around 2140. (b) As rB decreases after
every period of four years, designing a sufficient large transaction fee rF will be the main
economic source to maintain the operations management of a blockchain system.
Remark 4 To support the selfish mining behavior effectively, the efficiency-increased ratio
ℜ measures the improvement of management ability of the dishonest mining pool, the block-
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detained probability sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .} denotes the unfair competition strategy
used by the dishonest mining pool, and the jumping’s mining rate γ reflects the social
influence reputation of the dishonest mining pool in the world.
Remark 5 In the blockchain literature, ℜ = 0. Let CD and CH be the computational
powers of the dishonest and honest pools, respectively. Then the total computational power
of the blockchain system is given by C = CH +CD. Further, we assume that there exists a
constant κ > 0 such that α˜ = κCD, β = κCH and α˜+β = κC. Note that CD/C = α˜/ (κC)
and CH/C = β/ (κC) are respectively regarded as the mining rates of the dishonest and
honest pools in the literature. This paper takes a very different but more practical way to
express the mining rates.
3 A Pyramid Markov Process
In this section, we set up a new pyramid Markov process to analyze the blockchain selfish
mining with a two-block leading competitive criterion and with a new economic incentive
mechanism. Note that all the key factors or parameters designed in the blockchain selfish
mining are well related to the physical and dynamic structure of the pyramid Markov
process. In particular, we show that the pyramid Markov process is always irreducible
and positive recurrent, and that its stationary probability vector can be expressed as a
new matrix-geometric solution, where the rate matrix can be explicitly expressed by means
of the inverses of some upper triangular matrices of infinite size. Our matrix-geometric
solution is very different from that in Markov chains of GI/M/1 type, e.g., see Neuts [75]
and Li [56] for more details.
For the two block branches of a forked structure in the blockchain selfish mining, we
denote by I(t) and J(t) the numbers of blocks mined by the honest and dishonest pools
at time t, respectively. It is clear that {(I(t), J(t)) : t ≥ 0} is a continuous-time Markov
process whose state space is given by
Ω = Ω
0˜
∪
(
∞⋃
k=0
Ωk
)
,
where
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Level 0˜ : Ω
0˜
= {(0, 0)} ,
Level 0 : Ω0 = {(0, 1) , (0, 2) , (0, 3) , . . .} ,
Level 1 : Ω1 = {(1, 0) , (1, 1) , (1, 2) , (1, 3), . . .} ,
Level k : Ωk = {(k, k − 2) , (k, k − 1) , (k, k) , (k, k + 1), (k, k + 2) , . . .} , k ≥ 2.
Based on this, the state transition relation of the Markov process {(I(t), J(t)) : t ≥ 0} is
depicted in Figure 2. Obviously, the Markov process {(I(t), J(t)) : t ≥ 0} is of pyramid
type, thus it is also called a pyramid Markov process (perhaps such a pyramid is more
clearly seen from the multidimensional Markov process, which is related to multiple mining
pools).
Remark 6 State (0, 0) plays a key role in setting up the pyramid Markov process of two
block branches forked at a tree root. In fact, State (0, 0) describes the tree root as the
starting point of a fork attack, e.g., see Figure 2. If the pyramid Markov process enters
State (0, 0), then the fork attack ends immediately, and the main (longest) chain is pegged
on the blockchain.
By using Figure 2, the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process {(I(t), J(t)) : t ≥ 0}
is given by
Q =

Q
0˜,0˜
Q
0˜,0 Q0˜,1
Q0,0˜ Q0,0 Q0,1
Q1,0˜ Q1,1 Q1,2
B A C
B A C
...
. . .
. . .

, (2)
where a = (α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ), b = β − γ, ξk = a (1− pk) + b+ µpk for k ≥ 2,
Q
0˜,0˜
= − (a+ b) , Q
0˜,0 = (a, 0, 0, . . .) , Q0˜,1 = (b, 0, 0, . . .) ;
Q0,0˜ =

0
µp2
µp3
µp4
...

, Q0,1 =

0 b
0 b
0 b
0 b
. . .
. . .

,
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Figure 3: The state transition relation of the pyramid Markov process
Q0,0 =

− (a+ b) a
−ξ2 a (1− p2)
− ξ3 a (1− p3)
− ξ4
. . .
. . .

;
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Q1,0˜ =

0
0
0
µp2
µp3
µp4
...

, Q1,2 =

b
b
b
b
b
b
. . .

,
Q1,1 =

− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
−ξ2 a (1− p2)
−ξ3 a (1− p3)
. . .
. . .

;
B =

µ
0
0
0
µp2
µp3
...

, C =

0
b 0
b 0
b 0
b 0
b 0
. . .
. . .

,
A =

− (a+ µ) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
−ξ2 a (1− p2)
−ξ3 a (1− p3)
. . .
. . .

.
In the above matrices, we only give the non-zero elements, while all its zero elements
are empty with an easy understanding from the context of the state space Ω.
Theorem 1 The pyramid Markov process Q must be irreducible and positive recurrent.
16
Proof. First, it is easy to see Figure 2 that the pyramid Markov process Q is irre-
ducible, since for any two states (n1, n2) and (m1,m2) of the Markov process Q, there
must exist a state transition path such that the Markov process Q can arrive at state
(n1, n2) from the starting state (m1,m2).
Figure 4: Three different sub-Markov processes
To show the positive recurrence, we need to first prove the sub-Markov process only
observed within Level k is positive recurrent. From Figure 4, our analysis is to consider
the following two different cases:
Case one: The sub-Markov process {J (t) , I (t) = 0 or 1 : t ≥ 0} observed within
Level 0 or Level 1. Here, we only discuss the case with Level 0, while another case
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with Level 1 can be dealt with similarly.
It is easy to see from (a) of Figure 4 that the sub-Markov process {J (t) , I (t) = 0 : t ≥ 0}
observed within Level 0 has the state space ΩLevel 0 = {∆, 1, 2, 3, . . .}, and its infinitesimal
generator is given by
QLevel 0 =

−a a
0 −a a
µp2 − [µp2 + a (1− p2)] a (1− p2)
µp3 − [µp3 + a (1− p3)] a (1− p3)
...
. . .
. . .

.
Here, we apply the mean drift method to consider the stability of the sub-Markov process
QLevel 0. To this end, it is observed on state k that the mean drift rate of moving left to
state ∆ is given by k ·µpk; while the mean drift rate of moving right to state∞ is given by
1 · a (1− pk). Note that limk→∞ pk = 1, it is clear that limk→∞ k · µpk = limk→∞ kµ =∞
and limk→∞ 1 · a (1− pk) = 0. Thus there exists a sufficient large positive integer K such
that for any n > K
n · µpn > 1 · a (1− pn) ,
that is, for any n > K, the mean drift rate of moving left to state ∆ is bigger than the
mean drift rate of moving right to state ∞. Therefore, the sub-Markov process QLevel 0 is
stable.
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the two sub-Markov processes QLevel 0 and
QLevel 1 are all stable.
Case two: The sub-Markov process {J (t) , I (t) = k : t ≥ 0} observed within Level k
for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .. Here, we only discuss a case with Level k. It is easy to see from (c) of
Figure 4 that the sub-Markov process {J (t) , I (t) = k : t ≥ 0} observed within Level k has
the state space ΩLevel k = {∆, k − 2, k − 1, k, k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, . . .}, and its infinitesimal
18
generator is given by
QLevel k =

−a a
µ − (a+ µ) a
0 −a a
0 −a a
0 −a a
µp2 −η2 δ2
µp3 −η3 δ3
µp4 −η4 δ4
µp5 −η5 δ5
...
. . .
. . .

,
where ηk = µpk + a (1− pk) and δk = a (1− pk) for k = 3, 4, 5, . . ..
A similar analysis of mean drift can show that the sub-Markov process is irreducible
and positive recurrent for k = 2, 3, 4, . . ..
Corresponding to the state space ΩLevel k = {∆, k − 2, k − 1, k, k + 1, k + 2, k + 3, . . .},
we write the stationary probability vector of the sub-Markov process QLevel k as
θ = (θ∆, θ−2, θ−1, θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3, . . .) .
Through solving the system of linear equations θQLevel k = 0 and θe = 1, we obtain that
for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .,
θk =
δk−1δk−2δk−3 · · · δ2a
ηkηk−1ηk−2 · · · η3η2
a
a+ µ
θ∆,
θ1 = θ0 = θ−1 = θ−2 =
a
a+ µ
θ∆
and
θ∆ =
1
1 +
(
4 +
δk−1δk−2δk−3···δ2a
ηkηk−1ηk−2···η3η2
)
a
a+µ
.
Now, by using the stationary probability vector θ, we can compute the mean drift
rates of the pyramid Markov process Q on Level k for k > K, where K is a sufficiently
large positive integer.
Although state ∆ is introduced into the sub-Markov process QLevel k, we shall not
consider state ∆ to compute the mean drift rates of the pyramid Markov process Q on
Level k. Let θ˜ = (θ−2, θ−1, θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3, . . .). Then it is easy to see from Figure 3 that
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for the pyramid Markov process Q on Level k, the mean drift rate of moving left to state
Level 0˜ is given by
(k + 1) · θ˜B = (k + 1)
(
µθ−2 + µ
∞∑
k=2
θkpk
)
> µθ−2 (k + 1) ,
while the mean drift rate of moving right to Level ∞ is given by
1 · θ˜Ce = b
∞∑
k=−1
θk < b.
Since
lim
k→∞
(k + 1) · θ˜B > lim
k→∞
µθ−2 (k + 1) =∞ > b > 1 · θ˜Ce,
there exists a sufficient large positive integer K such that for any n > K
(n+ 1) · θ˜B > 1 · θ˜Ce.
Thus, for the pyramid Markov process Q on Level n with any n > K, the mean drift rate
of moving left to state Level 0˜ is bigger than the mean drift rate of moving right to Level
∞.
Based on the above discussion, for the pyramid Markov process Q, we obtain two basic
results: (i) The sub-Markov process QLevel k is stable for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .. (ii) For the
pyramid Markov process Q on Level n with any n > K, the mean drift rate of moving left
to state Level 0˜ is bigger than the mean drift rate of moving right to Level ∞. Therefore,
it follows from Li [56] that the pyramid Markov process Q must be positive recurrent.
This completes the proof. 
For i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., we define the probabilities
pi,j (t) = P {I(t) = i, J(t) = j}
and
pii,j = lim
t→+∞
pi,j (t) .
Also, we write
pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5, . . .
)
,
where
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pi0˜ = pi0,0,
pi0 = (pi0,1, pi0,2, pi0,3, pi0,4, . . .) ,
pi1 = (pi1,0, pi1,1, pi1,2, pi1,3, pi1,4, . . .) ,
pik = (pik,k−2, pik,k−1, pik,k, pik,k+1, pik,k+2, . . .) , k ≥ 2.
To express the stationary probability vector pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5, . . .
)
, we need
to compute the inverse matrices for a class of upper triangular matrices of infinite size,
for example, the matrices Q0,0, Q1,1 and A.
The following lemma provides the inverse of an upper triangular matrix of infinite size,
which is useful in our later study.
Lemma 1 Let dk 6= 0 for k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Then the upper triangular matrix
D =

d0 f0
d1 f1
d2 f2
d3 f3
. . .
. . .

is invertible, and there exists the unique inverse matrix as follows:
D−1 =

1
d0
− f0
d0d1
f0f1
d0d1d2
− f0f1f2
d0d1d2d3
f0f1f2f3
d0d1d2d3d4
· · ·
1
d1
− f1
d1d2
f1f2
d1d2d3
− f1f2f3
d1d2d3d4
· · ·
1
d2
− f2
d2d3
f2f3
d2d3d4
· · ·
1
d3
− f3
d3d4
· · ·
1
d4
· · ·
. . .

whose (k, k + l) st element is given by
D−1k,k+l = (−1)
l fkfk+1fk+2 · · · fk+l−1
dkdk+1dk+2 · · · dk+l−1dk+l
for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., and l = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ..
21
Proof. Note that dk 6= 0 for k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the upper triangular matrixD is invertible.
Let
X =

x0,0 x0,1 x0,2 x0,3 · · ·
x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 · · ·
x2,2 x2,3 · · ·
x3,3 · · ·
. . .

.
Then the invertible upper triangular matrix D must have the unique upper triangular in-
verse matrix. Then it follows from XD = I that for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., and l = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .,
xk,k+l = (−1)
l fkfk+1fk+2 · · · fk+l−1
dkdk+1dk+2 · · · dk+l−1dk+l
.
This proof is completed. 
By using Lemma 1, it is easy to explicitly express the inverse matrices of the matrices
Q0,0, Q1,1 and A. Here, we omit their details.
The following lemma indicates that each element of the matrix (I −R)−1 of infinite
sizes is finite. This result is necessary and useful for our later analysis.
Lemma 2 Let R = C (−A)−1 and (I −R)−1 =
∑∞
k=0R
k. Then each element of the
matrix (I −R)−1 of infinite sizes is finite.
Proof. Note that
(I −R)−1 =
[
I − C (−A)−1
]−1
= [− (A+ C)]−1 (−A) ,
where
A+C =

− (a+ µ) a
b − (a+ b) a
b − (a+ b) a
b − (a+ b) a
b −ξ2 a (1− p2)
b −ξ3 a (1− p3)
. . .
. . .
. . .

,
which is the infinitesimal generator of an irreducible birth-death process, and having
− (A+C) e = (µ, 0, 0, 0, µp2, µp3, µp4, . . .)
T .
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By using Section 3 in Chapter one of Li [56], for the irreducible birth-death process A+C,
we have the LU-type RG-factorization
A+ C = (I −RU )U (I −GL) ,
where
U = diag (U0, U1, U2, U3, . . .)
RU =

0 R0
0 R1
0 R2
0 R3
. . .
. . .

, GL =

0
G1 0
G2 0
G3 0
. . .
. . .

,
the real number sequence {Rk : k ≥ 0} is the minimal positive solution to the system of
nonlinear equations
R1R0b−R0 (a+ b) + a = 0,
R2R1b−R1 (a+ b) + a = 0,
R3R2b−R2 (a+ b) + a = 0,
Rk+1Rkb−Rkξk−1 + a = 0, k ≥ 3;
while the real number sequence {Gl : l ≥ 1} is the minimal positive solution to the system
of nonlinear equations
b−G1 (a+ b) +G2G1a = 0,
b−G2 (a+ b) +G3G2a = 0,
b−G3 (a+ b) +G4G3a = 0,
b−Gkξk−2 +Gk+1Gka = 0, k ≥ 4.
Furthermore, the real number sequence {Uk : k ≥ 0} is given by
U0 = − (a+ µ) +R0b = − (a+ µ) + aG1,
U1 = − (a+ b) +R1b = − (a+ b) + aG2,
U2 = − (a+ b) +R2b = − (a+ b) + aG3,
U3 = − (a+ b) +R3b = − (a+ b) + aG4,
Uk = −ξk−2 +Rkb = −ξk−2 + aGk+1, k ≥ 4.
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Thus we obtain
(I −R)−1 = [− (A+ C)]−1 (−A)
= (I −GL)
−1 diag
(
−U−10 ,−U
−1
1 ,−U
−1
2 ,−U
−1
3 , . . .
)
(I −RU )
−1 (−A) .
Some matrix computation indicate that each element of the matrix (I −R)−1 is finite.
This proof is completed. 
The following theorem provides an explicit expression for the stationary probability
vector pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5, . . .
)
by means of a new matrix-geometric solution with
the rate matrices
R = C (−A)−1 (3)
and
R˜ = Q1,2 (−A)
−1 . (4)
Theorem 2 The stationary probability vector pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5, . . .
)
of the
pyramid Markov process Q is matrix-geometric, given by
pik = pi1R˜R
k−2, k = 2, 3, 4, . . . , (5)
pi0 = pi0˜Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)
−1 ,
and pi0˜ and pi1 are determined by means of solving the following system of linear equations
(
pi0˜, pi1
) Q0˜,0˜ +Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)−1Q0,0˜ Q0˜,1 +Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)−1Q0,1
Q1,0˜ + R˜ (I −R)
−1B Q1,1
 = 0 (6)
with the normalized condition
pi0˜
[
1 +Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)
−1 e
]
+ pi1
[
I + R˜ (I −R)−1
]
e = 1, (7)
where e is a column vector of ones whose size is infinite.
Proof. From piQ = 0 and pie = 1, it is easy to see that
pi0˜Q0˜,0˜ + pi0Q0,0˜ + pi1Q1,0˜ +
∞∑
k=2
pikB = 0,
pi0˜Q0˜,0 + pi0Q0,0 = 0,
pi0˜Q0˜,1 + pi0Q0,1 + pi1Q1,1 = 0,
pi1Q1,2 + pi2A = 0,
pikC + pik+1A = 0, k ≥ 2.
(8)
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From the second equation of (8), it is easy to see that
pi0 = pi0˜Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)
−1 ,
and from the fourth and fifth equations of (8), it is easy to check that for k = 2, 3, 4, 5, . . . ,
pik = pi1R˜R
k−2.
Also, by using the first and third equations of (8), the boundary equation (6) is obtained.
Finally, the normalized condition (7) is given easily by means of pi0˜+
∑∞
k=0 pike = 1. This
proof is completed. 
Remark 7 Although the pyramid Markov process of blockchain selfish mining is very com-
plicated, we obtain two simple and interesting results: (a) The pyramid Markov process
must be irreducible and positive recurrent. This reveals that the blockchain selfish mining
system is always stable under both the two-block leading competitive criterion and the eco-
nomic incentive mechanism. (b) The stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric and
can be given an explicit expression by means of the two rate matrices R˜ and R, both of
which can be directly computed in terms of R = C (−A)−1 and R˜ = Q1,2 (−A)
−1. Thus,
our matrix-geometric solution is different from that in Markov chains of GI/M/1 type,
as seen in Neuts [75] having no explicit solution, because the rate matrix R only exists a
numerical solution from a nonlinear equation:
∑∞
k=0R
kAk = 0. (c) To our best knowl-
edge, our matrix-geometric solution of the pyramid Markov processes is the first one in
the study of blockchain selfish mining.
In the remainder of this section, we consider three special cases as follows:
Case one: p2 = 1.
In this case, the main chain with only two blocks by the dishonest mining pool is
pegged on the blockchain with probability one. Thus the dishonest main chain can not
continue to mine more new blocks, so that there do not exist all the states (k, k + l) for
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . and l = 3, 4, 5, . . .. Thus the infinitesimal generator of the pyramid Markov
process is simplified as
Q =

Q0,0 Q0,1
Q1,0 Q1,1 Q1,2
B A C
B A C
...
. . .
. . .

,
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where
Q0,0 =

−(a+ b) a
−(a+ b) a
µ − (µ+ b)
 , Q0,1 =

b
b
b 0
 ;
Q1,1 =

−(a+ b) a
−(a+ b) a
−(a+ b) a
− (µ+ b)
 ,
Q1,0 =

0
0
0
µ 0 0
 , Q1,2 =

b
b
b
b 0
 ;
A =

−µ 0
−(a+ b) a
−(a+ b) a
−(a+ b) a
− (µ+ b)

,
B =

µ
0
0
0
µ

, C =

0
b
b
b
b 0

.
Obviously, the pyramid Markov process Q is irreducible and positive recurrent, and its
stationary probability vector pi = (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, . . .) (note that pi0˜ is merged into pi0 as its
first element) is given by  pi1 = pi0Q0,1(−Q1,1)−1,pik = pi1R˜Rk−2, k = 2, 3, 4, . . . ,
where the vector pi0 is determined by the system of linear equations
pi0
{
Q0,0 +Q0,1(−Q1,1)
−1
[
Q1,0 + R˜ (I −R)
−1B
]}
= 0,
pi0
[
e+Q0,1(−Q1,1)
−1e+Q0,1(−Q1,1)
−1R˜ (I −R)−1 e
]
= 1.
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Note the two rate matrices: R = C (−A)−1 and R˜ = Q1,2 (−A)
−1 are the ordinary
computation of matrices of finite sizes.
Case two: 0 ≤ pi < 1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n0 − 1 and pn0 = 1.
In this case, it is easy to see that for the pyramid Markov process, there do not exist
all the states (k, k + l) for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . and l = n0+1, n0+2, n0+3, . . .. It is easy to see
that the two rate matrices: R = C (−A)−1 and R˜ = Q1,2 (−A)
−1 are also the ordinary
computation of matrices of finite sizes. Here, we omit the details of such a computation.
Based on this, our new matrix-geometric solution of pyramid Markov processes is very
useful in the study of blockchain selfish mining.
Case three: pk = 1 for k ≥ 1, and the two mining pools follow the one-block leading
competitive criterion.
In this case, this becomes the model given by Go˝bel et al. [31] under our blockchain-
pegged rule of the main chain. That is, once a main chain is formed, then the mining
provesses on the two block branches forked a tree root are terminated immediately. No
new block can be generated during the blockchain-pegged process of the main chain. Based
on this, it is easy to write the state transition relations of the pyramid Markov process as
follows:
(a) The blockchain-pegged states: (k, k − 1) for k ≥ 1 by the honest mining pool; and
(k − 1, k) for k ≥ 1 by the dishonest mining pool.
(b) The state transition rates of the pyramid Markov process are given by
q ((0, 0) , (0, 1)) = a, q ((0, 0) , (1, 0)) = b,
q ((0, 1) , (0, 0)) = µ, q ((0, 1) , (1, 1)) = b,
for k ≥ 1,
q ((k, k − 1) , (0, 0)) = µ, q ((k, k − 1) , (k, k)) = a,
q ((k, k) , (k, k + 1)) = a, q ((k, k) , (k + 1, k)) = b,
q ((k, k + 1) , (0, 0)) = µ, q ((k, k + 1) , (k + 1, k + 1)) = b.
Note that once a main chain is formed, then the mining provesses on the two block branches
forked a tree root are terminated immediately; and no new block can be generated during
the blockchain-pegged process of the main chain. Thus, our two-dimensional Markov
process is still different from that in Go˝bel et al. [31], because they did not consider
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the mining restriction that no new block can be generated during the blockchain-pegged
process of the main chain. Also, if pk = 1 for k ≥ 1, then by taking the main chain as the
blockchain-pegged unit, for l ≥ 1 we obtain
q ((k, k + l) , (k, k + l + 1)) = a (1− pl) = 0,
that is, for the dishonest mining in Figure 3, there do not exist state (k, k + l) for l ≥ 2
and k ≥ 0.
4 Analysis of Orphan Blocks
In this section, by using the stationary probability vector of the pyramid Markov process,
we analyze some interesting performance measures of the main chain and another chain of
orphan blocks. To our best knowledge, this is the first one to develop an effective method
in the study of orphan blocks.
When the honest and dishonest mining pools simultaneously begin a mining process,
it is see from Figure 2 that the selfish mining possibly results in two block branches of a
forked structure, in which one chain comes from the honest mining pool, while another
from the dishonest mining pool. Finally, the two block branches of a forked structure are
immediately terminated by using the two-block leading competitive criterion.
If the main chain is taken by the honest mining pool, then all the blocks on another
chain, which is set up by the dishonest mining pool, are regarded as orphan blocks. On
the contrary, if the main chain comes from the dishonest mining pool, then all the blocks
on another chain, which is established by the honest mining pool, are regarded as orphan
blocks. Obviously, the main chain and another chain of orphan blocks end at the same
moment that the main chain is confirmed.
Note that the main chain is taken by the honest mining pool only at state (k, k − 2)
with probability pik,k−2 for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .; while the main chain is taken by the dishonest
mining pool only at state (k, k + l) with probability pik,k+l for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , l = 2, 3, 4, . . ..
In addition, all the other states will not result in the main chain so that they can be
ignored. It is easy to see that
∑∞
k=2 pik,k−2 and
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=2 pik,k+l are the probabilities
that the main chain are taken by the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively.
Let PH and PD be the probabilities that the main chain is taken by the honest and
28
dishonest mining pools, respectively. Then
PH =
∞∑
k=2
pik,k−2
∞∑
k=2
pik,k−2 +
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pik,k+l
and
PD =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pik,k+l
∞∑
k=2
pik,k−2 +
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pik,k+l
.
(a) The average stationary lengths of the two chains
In two block branches of a forked structure, one is taken as the main chain, while
another is regarded as the chain of orphan blocks.
Let LM and LO be the average stationary lengths of the main chain and of another
chain of orphan blocks, respectively.
The following theorem provides an expressions for LM and LO by using the stationary
probability vector of the pyramid Markov process.
Theorem 3 (a) The average stationary length of the main chain is given by
LM = PH
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l)pik,k+l. (9)
(b)The average stationary length of the chain of orphan blocks is given by
LO = PH
∞∑
k=2
(k − 2) pik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
kpik,k+l. (10)
Proof. We only prove (a), while (b) can be proved similarly.
Let NM be the average stationary length of the main chain. Also, we introduce two
events as follows:
EH = {The main chain is taken by the honest mining pool}
and
ED = {The main chain is taken by the dishonest mining pool}
Then PH = P {EH} and PD = P {ED}. By applying the law of total probability, we have
LM = E [NM] = E [NM | EH]P {EH}+ E [NM | ED]P {ED} . (11)
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Note that E [NM | EH] =
∑∞
k=2 kpik,k−2, since the length of the honest main chain is k with
probability pik,k−2; while E [NM | ED] =
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=2 (k + l) pik,k+l, because the length of
the dishonest main chain is k + l with probability pik,k+l. Thus it follows from (11) that
LM = PH
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l)pik,k+l.
This completes the proof. 
(b) The blockchain pegged rate and the orphan block removed rate
Let ΥM and ΥO be the stationary blockchain pegged rate of the main chain, and the
stationary orphan block removed rate of the chain of orphan blocks, respectively. Then
the following theorem provides an expressions for ΥM and ΥO.
Theorem 4 (a) The stationary blockchain pegged rate of the main chain is given by
ΥM = µ
[
PH
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l) plpik,k+l
]
. (12)
(b) The stationary orphan block removed rate of the chain of orphan blocks is given by
ΥO = PH
∞∑
k=2
(k − 2)µpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
kµpik,k+l = µLO. (13)
Proof. The proof is similar to that in Theorem 3, while the only difference between
both of them comes from the following two points:
Point one: In the main chain (resp. another chain of orphan blocks), each of the
blocks that is submitted to the blockchain (resp. the transaction pool) has an exponential
network delay time with parameter µ. Thus the k blocks can have the exponential network
delay time with parameter kµ.
Point two: When the main chain is taken by the dishonest mining pool, it is key
to observe at state (k, k + l) that the main chain is published on the blockchain with
probability pl, while with probability 1−pl, the main chain is detained to continue mining
more blocks so that it is not broadcasted in the blockchain network. In this case, the
dishonest mining pool hopes to obtain more mining profit through winning on mining
more blocks. On the contrary, the stationary orphan block removed probability of the
chain of orphan blocks at state (k, k + l) is pik,k+l because the orphan blocks are removed
to the transaction pool with probability one. This completes the proof. 
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Now, we introduce two useful ratios of the blockchain selfish mining, which are neces-
sary and useful in design of blockchain under the blockchain selfish mining.
We define the ratio of two average stationary lengths as
φ =
LO
LM
=
PH
∞∑
k=2
(k − 2) pik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
kpik,k+l
PH
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l) pik,k+l
, (14)
and the stationary ratio of two block-passing-network rates as
ψ =
ΥO
ΥM
=
PH
∞∑
k=2
(k − 2) pik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
kpik,k+l
PH
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 + PD
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l) plpik,k+l
. (15)
It is easy to see that 0 < φ < ψ < 1. This shows that the main chain can not be pegged
on the blockchain due to the blockchain selfish mining.
In the remainder of this section, we develop some local performance measures of the
blockchain, and discuss their monotonous properties for the jumping’s mining rate γ and
the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ. Note that the monotonous properties are useful in our
study of the next section.
Let L
(H)
M and L
(D)
M be the average stationary lengths of the main chain by the honest
and dishonest mining pools, respectively; and L
(H)
O and L
(D)
O the average stationary lengths
of the chain of orphan blocks by the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. We
write
Λ =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l)pik,k+l.
The following corollary shows that the blockchain selfish mining makes a larger waste
of mining resources.
Corollary 5 For the blockchain selfish mining, we have
(a) 0 < L
(H)
M
− L
(H)
O
< 2,
(b) 0 < L
(D)
M
− L
(D)
O
< Λ, and
(c) 0 < LM − LO < 2PH + ΛPD.
Proof. We only prove (b), while (a) can be proved similarly.
It is easy to check that
L
(D)
M =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l) pik,k+l
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and
L
(D)
O =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
kpik,k+l.
Thus we obtain
L
(D)
M − L
(D)
O =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
lpik,k+l > 0
and
L
(D)
M − L
(D)
O =
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
lpik,k+l <
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l)pik,k+l = Λ.
Now, we prove (c). Since
LM = PHL
(H)
M + PDL
(D)
M
and
LO = PHL
(H)
O + PDL
(D)
O ,
we obtain
0 < LM − LO = PH
(
L
(H)
M − L
(H)
O
)
+ PD
(
L
(D)
M − L
(D)
O
)
< 2PH + ΛPD.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 6 In the blockchain selfish mining, we have
(a) the two average stationary lengths L
(H)
M
and L
(H)
O
decrease as the jumping’s mining
rate γ increases; and
(b) the two average stationary lengths L
(D)
M
and L
(D)
O
increase as the jumping’s mining
rate γ increases.
Proof. We only prove (a), while (b) can be proved similarly.
If decreasing the mining rate of the honest mining pool and simultaneously increasing
the mining rate of the dishonest mining pool, then the probability pik,k−2 decreases for
k ≥ 2.
As the jumping’s mining rate γ increases, the mining rate β − γ of the honest mining
pool decreases, and simultaneously the mining rate (α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ) of the dishonest mining
pool increases. Since
L
(H)
M =
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2
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and
L
(H)
O =
∞∑
k=2
(k − 2) pik,k−2,
it is easy to see that the two average stationary lengths L
(H)
M and L
(H)
O decrease as the
jumping’s mining rate γ increases. This completes the proof. 
Corollary 7 In the blockchain selfish mining, we have
(a) the two average stationary lengths L
(H)
M
and L
(H)
O
decrease as the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ increases; and
(b) the two average stationary lengths L
(D)
M
and L
(D)
O
increase as the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ increases.
Proof. We only prove (a), while (b) can be proved similarly.
We write
h (ℜ) =
β − γ
β − γ + (α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ)
and
d (ℜ) =
(α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ)
β − γ + (α˜+ γ) (1 + ℜ)
=
α˜+ γ
α˜+ γ + β−γ1+ℜ
.
It is easy to check that h (ℜ) decreases and d (ℜ) increases as the efficiency-increased ratio
ℜ increases.
When decreasing the relative mining rate h (ℜ) of the honest mining pool and si-
multaneously increasing the relative mining rate d (ℜ) of the dishonest mining pool, the
probability pik,k−2 can decrease. Thus, the two average stationary lengths L
(H)
M and L
(H)
O
decrease as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases. This completes the proof. 
Although Corollaries 6 and 7 provide some better monotonous properties for the local
performance measures (e.g., the average stationary lengths L
(H)
M and L
(H)
O , and L
(D)
M and
L
(D)
O ), there do not exist such a monotonicity for the total performance measures (e.g.,
LM and LO; ΥM and ΥO; and φ and ψ), this is due to their complicated structure, which
is established by means of the law of total probability. To explain the reason, we take a
simple example as follows:
E [NM] = E [NM | EH]P {EH}+ E [NM | ED]P {ED} .
As the jumping’s mining rate γ (or the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ) increases, the lo-
cal performance measures E [NM | EH]P {EH} and E [NM | ED]P {ED} are observed as
follows:
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(a) E [NM | EH]P {EH} increases but E [NM | ED]P {ED} decreases; or
(b) E [NM | EH]P {EH} decreases but E [NM | ED]P {ED} increases.
Obviously, no matter which one of (a) and (b) happened, we can not deduce such a
monotonicity of the total performance measures E [NM].
5 Markov Reward Processes
In this section, we set up a pyramid Markov reward process to evaluate the long-run
average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. Note that our
results apply the Markov reward process to provide a more complete and practical mining
profit than that in Eyal and Sirer [23].
For the pyramid Markov process {(I (t) , J (t)) : t ≥ 0}, let fH (I (t) , J (t)) and fD (I (t) , J (t))
be the reward functions received by the honest and dishonest mining pools at time t, re-
spectively. Then the average profits in the time interval [0, t) of the honest and dishonest
mining pools are respectively given by
RH (t) = E
[
1
t
∫ t
0
fH (I (t) , J (t)) dt
]
and
RD (t) = E
[
1
t
∫ t
0
fD (I (t) , J (t)) dt
]
.
By using Chapter 10 of Li [56], the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest
mining pools are respectively given by
RH = lim
t→+∞
RH (t) =
1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
pii,jfH (i, j) +
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,jfH (i, j) (16)
and
RD = lim
t→+∞
RD (t) ==
1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
pii,jfD (i, j) +
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,jfD (i, j) . (17)
Note that the stationary probability vector pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5, . . .
)
is given
in Theorem 2, it is easy to see from (16) and (17) that we first need to express the two
reward functions fH (i, j) and fD (i, j) for i, j = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .. From the model description
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of Section 2, we can obtain
fH (i, j) =
 kµ (rB + rF )− (cE + cA) (β − γ) , for i = k, j = k − 2, k ≥ 2,− (cE + cA) (β − γ) , for all the other states;
=
 kµ (rB + rF )− (cE + cA) (β − γ) , for i = k, j = k − 2, k ≥ 2,− (cE + cA) (β − γ) , for all the other states;
and
fD (i, j) =

(k + l)µpl (rB + rF )
− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] ,
for i = k, j = k + l,
k ≥ 0, l ≥ 2;
− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] , for all the other states.
To further express the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining
pools, we need to introduce the Hadamard product of two vectors W = (w1, w2, w3, . . .)
and V = (v1, v2, v3, . . .) as follows:
W ⊙ V = (w1v1, w2v2, w3v3, . . .) .
It is easy to check that
W ⊙ V1 +W ⊙ V2 =W ⊙ (V1 + V2) .
Let e1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, . . .).
The following theorem provides an explicit expression for the long-run average profit
RH of the honest mining pool.
Theorem 8 The long-run average profit of the honest mining pool is given by
RH = µ (rB + rF )
{
e1 ⊙
{
pi1R˜
[
(I −R)−1 + (I −R)−2
]}}
e− (cE + cA) (β − γ) . (18)
Proof. Note that
RH =
1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
pii,jfH (i, j) +
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,jfH (i, j)
= µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 − (cE + cA) (β − γ)
 1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
+
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,j,
since
(∑1
i=0
∑∞
j=0+
∑∞
i=2
∑∞
j=i−2
)
pii,j = 1 and
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 =
∞∑
k=2
(e1 ⊙ kpik) e =
{
e1 ⊙
(
pi1R˜
∞∑
k=2
kRk−2
)}
e
=
{
e1 ⊙
{
pi1R˜
[
(I −R)−1 + (I −R)−2
]}}
e,
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we obtain
RH = µ (rB + rF )
{
e1 ⊙
{
pi1R˜
[
(I −R)−1 + (I −R)−2
]}}
e− (cE + cA) (β − γ) .
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 9 In the blockchain selfish mining, we have
(a) the long-run average profit RH of the honest mining pool decreases as the jumping’s
mining rate γ increases;
(b) the long-run average profit RH of the honest mining pool decreases as the efficiency-
increased ratio ℜ increases.
Proof. Note that
RH = µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 − (cE + cA) (β − γ) , (19)
as the jumping’s mining rate γ or the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases, it is easy to
see from Corollaries 6 and 7 that the long-run average profit RH of the honest mining
pool decreases. This completes the proof. 
Now, we consider the long-run average profit of the dishonest mining pool, which is a
bit more complicated than that of the long-run average profit of the honest mining pool.
Let
p0 = (0, 2p2, 3p3, 4p4, 5p5, . . .) ,
p1 = (0, 0, 0, 3p2 , 4p3, 5p4, 6p5, . . .)
and
pk = (0, 0, 0, 0, (k + 2) p2, (k + 3) p3, (k + 4) p4, (k + 5) p5, . . .) , k ≥ 2.
The following theorem provides an explicit expression for the long-run average profit
RD of the dishonest mining pool.
Theorem 10 The long-run average profit of the dishonest mining pool is given by
RD = µ (rB + rF )
{
p0 ⊙
[
pi0˜Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)
−1
]
+ p1 ⊙ pi1 +
∞∑
k=2
pk ⊙
(
pi1R˜R
k−2
)}
e
− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 +ℜ)] . (20)
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Proof. Note that
RD =
1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
pii,jfD (i, j) +
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,jfD (i, j)
= µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pl (k + l)pik,k+l
− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)]
 1∑
i=0
∞∑
j=0
+
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=i−2
pii,j,
since
(∑1
i=0
∑∞
j=0+
∑∞
i=2
∑∞
j=i−2
)
pii,j = 1, and
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pl (k + l) pik,k+l =
{
p0 ⊙
[
pi0˜Q0˜,0 (−Q0,0)
−1
]
+ p1 ⊙ pi1 +
∞∑
k=2
pk ⊙
(
pi1R˜R
k−2
)}
e,
this gives the desired result. This completes the proof. 
Corollary 11 In the blockchain selfish mining, we have
(a) The long-run average profit RD of the dishonest mining pool increases as the jump-
ing’s mining rate γ increases; and
(b) The long-run average profit RD of the dishonest mining pool increases as the
efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases.
Proof. This proof only needs to note that
RD = µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pl (k + l)pik,k+l − (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] . (21)
By using Corollaries 6 and 7, it is easy to give our desired result. This completes the
proof. 
The following theorem provides a multivariate linear structure for the two long-run av-
erage profits RH and RD. This result is very necessary and useful for discussing economics
of blockchain both from design perspective and from operations management. While its
proof is very easy from (19) and (21), thus it is omitted here.
Theorem 12 In the blockchain selfish mining, the two long-run average profits RH and
RD are all multivariate linear for the three key parameters: rB + rF , cE and cA.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition under which the blockchain is at
the normal operations state. This result is necessary and useful for economically guaran-
teeing the normal operations of the blockchain system in practice.
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Theorem 13 In the blockchain selfish mining, there exists a minimal positive number V
such that for rB + rF > V, the blockchain can be at the normal operations state.
Proof. In the blockchain selfish mining, to guarantee the normal operations of
blockchain, we need to satisfy two basic conditions: RH > 0 and RD > 0. It follows
from (19) and (21) that RH > 0 and RD > 0 if
(rB + rF ) >
(cE + cA) (β − γ)
µ
∑∞
k=2 kpik,k−2
and
(rB + rF ) >
(α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)]
µ
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=2 pl (k + l)pik,k+l
.
Let
V = max
{
(cE + cA) (β − γ)
µ
∑∞
k=2 kpik,k−2
,
(α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)]
µ
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=2 pl (k + l) pik,k+l
}
.
Then if rB + rF > V, then RH > 0 and RD > 0. This completes the proof. 
In the remainder of this section, we further provide a long-run economic growth ratio
of the dishonest mining pool compared to the honest mining pool. To this end, our aim
is to focus on the net mining rate per unit. We define
ℑ =
1
α˜+γRD
1
β−γRH
=
β − γ
α˜+ γ
RD
RH
. (22)
Obviously, the index ℑ measures the actual mining advantage of the dishonest mining
pool under a strictly mathematical setting. Therefore, our result considerably improved
that pool’s revenue given in (3) of Eyal and Sirer [23].
A conjecture: We can observe from some practical points of view, and thus deduce
a basic results: ℑ > 1 under the two conditions: ℜ > 0, and rB + rF is larger. In Section
9, we can provide some numerical analysis which supports this conjecture.
The following theorem provides a useful approximate evaluation for the long-run eco-
nomic growth ratio of the dishonest mining pool if rB + rF is larger.
Theorem 14 In the blockchain selfish mining, if max{cE , cA} / (rB + rF ) ≈ 0, then there
exists a positive constant C such that ℑ ≈ C.
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Proof. It follows from (22), (19) and (21) that for max{cE , cA} / (rB + rF ) ≈ 0,
ℑ =
β − γ
α˜+ γ
RD
RH
=
β − γ
α˜+ γ
µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pl (k + l) pik,k+l − (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)]
µ (rB + rF )
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2 − (cE + cA) (β − γ)
≈
β − γ
α˜+ γ
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
pl (k + l) pik,k+l
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2
def
== C.
This completes the proof. 
In what follows, we consider a simple and non-economic case: A long-run blockchain-
pegged growth ratio of the dishonest mining pool. We define
τ =
1
α˜+γ
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l)µplpik,k+l
1
β−γ
∞∑
k=2
kµpik,k−2
=
β − γ
α˜+ γ
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=2
(k + l) plpik,k+l
∞∑
k=2
kpik,k−2
.
A conjecture: We can deduce a basic results: τ > 1 under the two conditions: ℜ > 0,
and rB+rF is larger. In Section 9, we can provide some numerical analysis which supports
this conjecture.
The following corollary provides an interesting monotonicity both for the long-run
economic growth ratio ℑ and for the long-run blockchain-pegged growth ratio τ with
respect to the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ. The proof is easy by means of (b) of Corollaries
9 and 11, and thus it is omitted here.
Corollary 15 In the blockchain selfish mining, each of the two long-run ratios ℑ and τ
increases, as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases.
Remark 8 It is worthwhile to note that the two indices ℑ and τ are a strictly mathemat-
ical promotion comparing to the revenue analysis (e.g., (1) to (3)) given in Subsection 4.1
of Eyal and Sirer [23]. In addition, we show that the revenue analysis of blockchain should
be more complicated and difficult, because the blockchain is always a complex stochastic
system, e.g., see Li et al. [57, 58] for more details.
Remark 9 By establishing the pyramid Markov reward process, this papers investigates
the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. Fur-
thermore, we show that the long-run average profits are multivariate linear for either the
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economic earning of each mined block, the electricity price, or the mining management
fee per unit of mining rate. Specifically, we can measure the mining efficiency of the dis-
honest mining pool. Thus, our method of pyramid Markov reward processes can effectively
improve the intuitive revenue analysis of Eyal and Sirer [23].
6 The Mining Profits in the Time Interval [0, t)
In this section, we compute the mining profits in the time interval [0, t) of the honest
and dishonest mining pools by means of the PH distributions of infinite size and their
PH renewal processes. By choosing some different initial probability vectors, we provide
multiple perspectives in understanding such a mining profit in the time interval [0, t).
Now, when taking state (0, 0) as an absorbing state of the honest and dishonest mining
processes, corresponding to the vector (pi0, pi1, pi2, . . .) (here pi0˜ is omitted), we choose three
different initial probability vectors as follows:
(1) The initial probability vector
ω = ((a/ (a+ b) , 0, 0, . . .) , (b/ (a+ b) , 0, 0, . . .) ,0,0,0, . . .) ,
where 0 = (0, 0, 0, . . .). This indicates that the mining process begins at the initial time 0
either from Level 0 with probability a/ (a+ b) or from Level 1 with probability b/ (a+ b).
(2) The initial probability vector
ω =
1
1− pi0˜
(pi0, pi1, pi2, . . .) .
It shows that the mining process begins at the initial time 0 from some states with a proba-
bility vector ω, which is given from the stationary probability vector pi =
(
pi0˜, pi0, pi1, pi2, . . .
)
,
and a normalized condition ωe = 1 because (0, 0) is an absorbing state.
(3) The initial probability vector
ω =
1
∞∑
i=1
pii,i
(0, ω˜1, ω˜2, ω˜3, . . .) ,
where ω˜k = (0, 0, . . . , 0, pik,k, 0, 0, . . . , 0) for k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. This demonstrates that the
mining process begins at the initial time 0 from state (k, k) of Level k with probability
pik,k/
∑∞
i=1 pii,i.
For the three different initial probability vectors, our aim is to be able to understand
the mining competition between the two honest and dishonest mining pools.
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In what follows we consider the two honest and dishonest mining processes under the
initial probability vector ω, and show that each of the two mining processes corresponds
to a PH distribution of infinite size.
(a) The honest mining pool
We assume that the main chain by the honest mining pool is pegged on the blockchain.
In this case, the honest mining process is still a pyramid Markov process QH with an
absorbing state (0, 0), whose state transition relation is depicted in Figure 5, which comes
from Figure 3 by noting that the main chain by the dishonest mining pool can not be
pegged on the blockchain.
Figure 5: The state transition relation of the pyramid Markov process QH
From Figure 5, we write the infinitesimal generator of the pyramid Markov process
with an absorbing state (0, 0) as
QH =
 0 0
T 0 T
 ,
where
T =

T0 T1
T0 T2
T3 T4
T3 T4
. . .
. . .

, T 0 =

0
0
T 03
T 03
...

(23)
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T0 =

− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
. . .
. . .

,
T1 =

0 b
b
b
b
. . .

, T2 =

b
b
b
b
. . .

,
T3 =

− (µ+ a) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
. . .
. . .

,
T 03 =

µ
0
0
0
...

, T4 =

0
b
b
b
. . .

.
When the main chain by the honest mining pool is pegged on the blockchain, we
denote by χH the time duration from the same initial moment of mining of the honest
and dishonest pools until the main chain by the honest mining pool is pegged on the
blockchain. We call χH a blockchain-pegged time of the honest mining pool.
Theorem 16 The blockchain-pegged time χH of the honest mining pool is of phase type
with irreducible representation (ω, T ) of infinite size. At the same time, we have
E
[
(χH)
k
]
= (−1)kk!ωT−ke.
Proof. To check whether the blockchain-pegged time χH is of phase type or not, it
is key to prove that the matrix T is invertible. By using Lemma 1, it is easy to check
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that the two matrices T0 and T3 of infinite size are invertible, and their inverse matrices
are obtained easily. Thus the matrix T is invertible. To compute the inverse matrix of T ,
from (20) we write
T−1 =

X0,0 X0,1 X0,2 X0,3 · · ·
X1,1 X1,2 X1,3 · · ·
X2,2 X2,3 · · ·
X3,3 · · ·
. . .

.
From T−1T = I, we obtain
X0,0 = X1,1 = T
−1
0 , Xk,k = T
−1
3 for k = 2, 3, 4, . . . ,
X0,1 = −T
−1
0 T1T
−1
0 , X0,l = (−1)
l T−10 T1T
−1
0 T2
(
T−13 T4
)l−2
T−13 for l = 2, 3, 4, . . . ,
X1,1+l = (−)
l T−10 T2
(
T−13 T4
)l−1
T−13 for l = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ,
and for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .
Xk,k+l = (−)
l
(
T−13 T4
)l
T−13 for l = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ,
It is easy to see from Figure 5 that the blockchain-pegged time χH is of phase type, and
has the irreducible representation (ω, T ) of infinite size due to the fact that the Markov
process T + T 0ω is irreducible. This completes the proof. 
When the mining difficulty is not adjusted and changed, it is easy to see that the
blockchain-pegged process of the honest mining pool is a renewal process whose interarrival
time is the blockchain-pegged time χH. Note that the blockchain-pegged time χH is of
phase type with irreducible representation (ω, T ) of infinite size, and its associated renewal
process is a PH renewal process of infinite size.
LetNH(t) denote the number of renewals of this PH renewal process in the time interval
(0, t), and J(t) is its phase at time t. We write
Pi,j(n, t) = P {NH(t) = n, J(t) = j | NH(0) = 0, J(0) = i}
for n ≥ 0 and i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We denote by P (n, t) a matrix of infinite size with the
(i, j)th element Pi,j(n, t). It is clear from Neuts [75] and Li [56] that the matrix sequence
{P (n, t)} satisfy the Chapman-Kolmogorov differential equations as follows:
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ddt
P (0, t) = TP (0, t)
d
dt
P (n, t) = TP (n, t) + T 0ωP (n− 1, t), n ≥ 1,
with P (n, 0) = δn0I. Let P
∗(z, t) =
∞∑
n=0
znP (n, t). Then
P ∗(z, t) = exp
{
(T + zT 0ω)t
}
, t ≥ 0.
Let Q∗H = T+ T
0ω, where T and T 0 are given in (23). Note that the Markov process
Q∗H is irreducible and positive recurrent, thus there must exist the stationary probability
vector υ such that υQ∗H = 0 and υe = 1. In this case, we have
E [NH(t)] =
d
dz
υP ∗(z, t)e|z=1e = υT
0ωt exp(Q∗Ht)e
=
t
E [(χH)]
ω exp(Q∗Ht)e,
Since υT 0 = 1/E [(χH)]. Therefore, the mining profit in the time interval [0, t) of the
honest mining pool is given by
RH (t) = E [NH(t)] (rB + rF )− t (cE + cA) (β − γ)
=
t (rB + rF )
E [(χH)]
ω exp(Q∗Ht)e− t (cE + cA) (β − γ) .
(b) The dishonest mining pool
By a similar analysis to that in (a), we can discuss the mining profit in the time interval
[0, t) of the dishonest mining pool. Here, we provide a simple outline of such a similar
analysis.
We assume that the main chain by the dishonest mining pool is pegged on the blockchain.
In this case, the dishonest mining process is still a pyramid Markov process with an ab-
sorbing state (0, 0), whose state transition relation is changed to Figure 6 modified from
Figure 3.
From Figure 6, we write the infinitesimal generator of the pyramid Markov process
with an absorbing state (0, 0) as
QD =
 0 0
S0 S
 ,
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Figure 6: The state transition relation of the pyramid Markov process QD
where
S =

Q0,0 Q0,1
Q1,1 Q1,2
A C
A C
. . .
. . .

, S0 =

S00
S01
S02
S02
...

, (24)
Q0,0, Q0,1, Q1,1, Q1,2 and C are given from the infinitesimal generator Q in Section 4,
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A =

−a a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
− (a+ b) a
−ξ2 a (1− p2)
−ξ3 a (1− p3)
. . .
. . .

,
and
S00 =

0
µp2
µp3
µp4
µp5
µp6
...

, S01 =

0
0
0
µp2
µp3
µp4
...

, S02 =

0
0
0
0
µp2
µp3
...

.
When the main chain by the dishonest mining pool is pegged on the blockchain, we
denote by χD the time duration from the same initial moment of mining of the dishonest
and dishonest pools until the main chain by the honest mining pool is pegged on the
blockchain. Clearly, χD is a blockchain-pegged time of the dishonest mining pool.
Theorem 17 The blockchain-pegged time χD of the dishonest mining pool is of phase type
with irreducible representation (ω, S) of infinite size. At the same time, we have
E
[
(χD)
k
]
= (−1)kk!ωS−ke.
Finally, the mining profit in the time interval [0, t) of the dishonest mining pool is
given by
RH (t) =
t (rB + rF )
E [(χD)]
ω exp(Q∗Dt)e− t (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] ,
where Q∗D = S + S
0ω, while S and S0 are given in (24).
7 An Approximate Computational Model
In this section, we provide a new approximate computational model to further deal with
the mining processes of the two honest and dishonest mining pools. To this end, we
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establish three different Markov processes to express the blockchain selfish mining.
Let NH(t) and ND(t) denote the numbers of blocks mined by the honest and dishonest
mining pools in the time interval [0, t), respectively. We write N (t) = ND(t)−NH(t). It is
easy to see from Figure 3 that either N (t) ∈ E0 = {(0, 0) , 0, 1, 2, . . .} on Level 0, N (t) ∈
E1 = {(0, 0) ,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .} on Level 1, or N (t) ∈ E2 = {(0, 0) ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .} on
Level k for k = 2, 3, 4, 5, . . .. It is easy to see from model description that {N (t) : t ≥ 0}
is a Markov process, whose three state transition relations are depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7: The state transition relations of three Markov processes
Based on the state spaces E0, E1 and E2, we need to consider three different Markov
processes as follows:
Case one: The Markov process on E0 = {(0, 0) , 0, 1, 2, . . .}
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From (a) of Figure 7, the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process on E0 is given
by
QE0 =

−a 0 a
0 −a a
0 b − (a+ b) a
µp2 b −ξ2 a (1− p2)
µp3 b −ξ3 a (1− p3)
µp4 b −ξ4 a (1− p4)
...
. . .
. . .
. . .

.
By using the mean drift method, it is easy to check that the Markov process on E0 is
irreducible and positive recurrent. Let Ψ(0) =
(
ψ
(0)
0,0, ψ
(0)
0 , ψ
(0)
1 , ψ
(0)
2 , . . .
)
be the stationary
probability vector of the Markov process QE0 . Then from Ψ
(0)QE0 = 0 and Ψ
(0)e = 1, by
using Section 1.3 in Chapter one of Li [56], we obtain
ψ
(0)
0,0 =
(
1−
b
a
R
(0)
2
)
ψ
(0)
1 ,
ψ
(0)
0 =
b
a
ψ
(0)
1 ,
for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .
ψ
(0)
k = ψ
(0)
1 R
(0)
k R
(0)
k−1R
(0)
k−2 · · ·R
(0)
2
and
ψ
(0)
1 =
a
2a− bR
(0)
2 + a
∞∑
k=0
R
(0)
k R
(0)
k−1R
(0)
k−2 · · ·R
(0)
1 R
(0)
0
,
where the real number sequence
{
R
(0)
k : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .
}
is the minimal positive solution
to the system of nonlinear equations
a− ξ2R
(0)
2 + bR
(0)
2 R
(0)
3 = 0, (25)
and for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .
a (1− pk)− ξk+1R
(0)
k+1 + bR
(0)
k+1R
(0)
k+2 = 0. (26)
It is a key to solve the system of nonlinear equations (25) and (26). To this end, some
effective algorithms were developed in Bright and Taylor [9, 10], and also Liu et al. [59]
provided some practical examples of such a computation. Here, we omit the details of
numerically solving the system of nonlinear equations (25) and (26).
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Remark 10 Since the Markov process QE0 is not a birth-death process, it does not have
an explicit expression for the stationary probability vector. Despite of this, it still has the
structure of a birth-death process only except for the boundary states: (0, 0), 0 and 1, thus
we can apply the matrix-product solution of the Quasi-Birth-and-Death (QBD) process to
express the stationary probability vector.
Case two: The Markov process on E1 = {(0, 0) ,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
From (b) of Figure 7, the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process on E1 is given
by
QE1 =

− (a+ b) b 0 a
0 −a a 0
0 b − (a+ b) a
0 b − (a+ b) a
µp2 b −ξ2 a (1− p2)
µp3 b −ξ3 a (1− p3)
...
. . .
. . .
. . .

.
Clearly, the Markov process on E1 is irreducible and positive recurrent, and its stationary
probability vector Ψ(1) =
(
ψ
(1)
0,0, ψ
(1)
−1 , ψ
(1)
0 , ψ
(1)
1 , ψ
(1)
2 , . . .
)
can be similarly given by means
of that of the Markov process on E0 discussed in Case one. Here, we omit its details.
Case three: The Markov process on E2 = {(0, 0) ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
From (c) of Figure 7, the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process on E2 is given
by
QE2 =

− (a+ b) 0 b 0 a
µ − (a+ µ) a 0 0
0 b − (a+ b) a 0
0 b − (a+ b) a
0 b − (a+ b) a
µp2 b −ξ2 a (1− p2)
µp3 b −ξ3 a (1− p3)
...
. . .
. . .
. . .

.
Clearly, the Markov process on E2 is irreducible and positive recurrent, and its stationary
probability vector Ψ(2) =
(
ψ
(2)
0,0 , ψ
(2)
−2 , ψ
(2)
−1 , ψ
(2)
0 , ψ
(2)
1 , ψ
(2)
2 , . . .
)
can similarly be given by
means of that of the Markov process on E0 discussed in Case one.
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In what follows we show how to use the stationary probability vectors Ψ(0), Ψ(1) and
Ψ(2) to study the blockchain selfish mining. To this end, we only analyze Case three:
Markov process QE2 on state space E2; while for the other two cases, we can deal with
similarly.
For the Markov process QE2 on state space E2, let RH (2) and RD (2) be the relative
long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively, when the
main chain is pegged on the blockchain. Then for Case three, we have
RH (2) = ψ
(2)
−22µ (rB + rF )−
∞∑
i=−2
ψ
(2)
i (cE + cA) (β − γ)
= ψ
(2)
−22µ (rB + rF )− (cE + cA) (β − γ)
and
RD (2) =
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k pkkµ (rB + rF )−
∞∑
i=−2
ψ
(2)
i (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)]
=
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k pkkµ (rB + rF )− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] .
Further, the total relative long-run average profit of the blockchain is given by
R (2) =ρ1RH (2) + ρ2RD (2)
=ρ1ψ
(2)
−22µ (rB + rF ) + ρ2
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k kpkµ (rB + rF )
− ρ1 (cE + cA) (β − γ)− ρ2 (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] , (27)
where
ρ1 =
ψ
(2)
−2
ψ
(2)
−2 +
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k
, ρ2 =
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k
ψ
(2)
−2 +
∞∑
k=2
ψ
(2)
k
,
Remark 11 To analyze the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest min-
ing pools, it is easy to see from (27) and Figure 7 that when using the Markov process
{N (t) : t ≥ 0} where N (t) = ND(t)−NH(t), it becomes more difficult than that given in
Theorems 8 and 10 because we only can numerically compute the stationary probability
vector Ψ(2) =
(
ψ
(2)
0,0, ψ
(2)
−2 , ψ
(2)
−1 , ψ
(2)
0 , ψ
(2)
1 , ψ
(2)
2 , . . .
)
. On the other hand, we can provide
only a part information R (2) = ρ1RH (2) + ρ2RD (2) for the long-run average profits of
the honest and dishonest mining pools. Therefore, by comparing (27) with Theorems 8
and 10, we show that Theorems 8 and 10 provide a more complete result.
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Finally, we provide a long-run economic growth ratio of the dishonest mining pool
compared to the honest mining pool through using per unit net mining rate. We define
ℑ =
1
α˜+γRD (2)
1
β−γRH (2)
=
β − γ
α˜+ γ
RD (2)
RH (2)
. (28)
A conjecture: We can deduce two basic results: (a) ℑ > 1 under the two conditions:
ℜ > 0, and rB + rF is larger. (b) the long-run ratio ℑ increases as the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ increases.
8 No Network Latency
In this section, we further discuss a special case with no network latency, as discussed for
the three approximate computational models in Section 7. Similarly, we also set up three
different Markov processes whose aim is to deal with the influence of no network latency
on the blockchain selfish mining.
When the network latency is very short so that it can be ignored, we assume that
µ = +∞ or 1/µ = 0. In this case, Figure 8 provides three types of state transition
relations of the Markov process {N (t) : t ≥ 0}.
In what follows, we only deal with (c) of Figure 8; while for (a) and (b) of Figure 8,
we can discuss similarly, and omit their details here.
From (c) of Figure 8, the infinitesimal generator of the Markov process on E1 is given
by
Qµ=+∞ =

− (a+ b) b 0 a
b − (a+ b) a 0
0 b − (a+ b) a
ap2 b − (a+ b) a (1− p2)
ap3 b − (a+ b) a (1− p3)
...
. . .
. . .
. . .

.
Obviously, the Markov process Qµ=+∞ on E1 is irreducible and positive recurrent. Let
Ψ(3) =
(
ψ
(3)
0,0 , ψ
(3)
−1 , ψ
(3)
0 , ψ
(3)
1 , ψ
(3)
2 , . . .
)
be the stationary probability vector of the Markov
process Qµ=+∞. Then from Ψ
(3)Qµ=+∞ = 0 and Ψ
(3)e = 1, by using Section 1.3 in
Chapter one of Li [56], we obtain that for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .,
ψ
(3)
k = ψ
(3)
1 R
(30)
k−1R
(3)
k−2 · · ·R
(3)
2 R
(3)
1 ,
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Figure 8: The state transition relations of the Markov process for µ = +∞
and ψ
(3)
0,0 , ψ
(3)
−1 , ψ
(3)
0 and ψ
(3)
1 satisfy the following system of linear equations
−ψ
(3)
0,0 (a+ b) + ψ
(3)
−1b+ ψ
(3)
1
(
ap2 +
∞∑
k=2
apk+1R
(3)
k−1R
(3)
k−2 · · ·R
(3)
2 R
(3)
1
)
= 0,
ψ
(3)
0,0b− ψ
(3)
−1 (a+ b) + ψ
(3)
0 b = 0,
ψ
(3)
−1a− ψ
(3)
0 (a+ b) + ψ
(3)
1 b = 0,
ψ
(3)
0,0a+ ψ
(3)
0 a− ψ
(3)
1 (a+ b) + ψ
(3)
1 R
(3)
1 b = 0,
ψ
(3)
0,0 + ψ
(3)
−1 + ψ
(3)
0 + ψ
(3)
1
(
1 +
∞∑
k=2
R
(30)
k−1R
(3)
k−2 · · ·R
(3)
2 R
(3)
1
)
= 1,
where the real number sequence
{
R
(3)
k : k = 1, 2, 3, . . .
}
is the minimal positive solution
to the system of nonlinear equations
a (1− pk)−R
(3)
k−1 (a+ b) +R
(3)
k R
(3)
k−1b = 0, k = 2, 3, 4, . . . . (29)
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Similarly, we can solve the system of nonlinear equations (29) by means of the effective
algorithms developed in Bright and Taylor [9, 10] and Liu et al. [59]. Here, we omit the
algorithmic details.
For the the Markov process Qµ=+∞ on state E1, we denote by R
(∞)
H (3) and R
(∞)
D (3)
the relative long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively,
when the main chain is pegged on the blockchain. Then for Case three, we have
R
(∞)
H (3) = bψ
(3)
−1 · 2 (rB + rF )− (cE + cA) (β − γ) ,
R
(∞)
D (3) = a
∞∑
k=1
ψ
(3)
k · pk+1 (k + 1) (rB + rF )− (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 +ℜ)] .
Thus, the total relative long-run average profit of the blockchain is given by
R(∞) (3) =ρ1R
(∞)
H (3) + ρ2R
(∞)
D (3)
=ρ1bψ
(3)
−1 · 2 (rB + rF ) + ρ2a
∞∑
k=1
ψ
(3)
k · pk+1 (k + 1) (rB + rF )
− ρ1 (cE + cA) (β − γ)− ρ2 (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] , (30)
where
ρ1 =
ψ
(3)
−1
ψ
(3)
−1 +
∞∑
k=1
ψ
(3)
k
, ρ2 =
∞∑
k=1
ψ
(3)
k
ψ
(3)
−1 +
∞∑
k=1
ψ
(3)
k
.
In what follows we first discuss a special case with p2 = 1. Then we provide a detailed
comparison between our work and Eyal and Sirer[23]. This is necessary and useful for
understanding the methodology and main results of Eyal and Sirer[23].
When p2 = 1, the state transition relations of the Markov process Qµ=+∞ is changed
to Figure 9 from Figure 8. It is easy to see that the Markov process Qµ=+∞ can not arrive
at the state k for k = 2, 3, 4, . . .. In this case, the infinitesimal generator related to (c) of
Figure 9 is given by
Qµ=+∞ =

− (a+ b) b 0 a
b − (a+ b) a 0
0 b − (a+ b) a
a 0 b − (a+ b)
 .
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Figure 9: A corresponding Markov process (for µ = +∞) to Eyal and Sirer[23]
Since the Markov process Qµ=+∞ is irreducible and positive recurrent, its stationary
probability vector is given by
Ψ(4) =
(
ψ
(4)
0,0 , ψ
(4)
−1 , ψ
(4)
0 , ψ
(4)
1
)
=
(
a2 + b2
2 (a+ b)2
,
b
2 (a+ b)
,
ab
(a+ b)2
,
a
2 (a+ b)
)
.
Further, we obtain
R(∞) (4) =ρ1R
(∞)
H (4) + ρ2R
(∞)
D (4)
=ρ˜1bψ
(4)
−1 · 2 (rB + rF ) + ρ˜2aψ
(4)
1 · 2 (rB + rF )
− ρ˜1 (cE + cA) (β − γ)− ρ˜2 (α˜+ γ) [cE + cA (1 + ℜ)] , (31)
where
ρ˜1 =
ψ
(4)
−1
ψ
(4)
−1 + ψ
(4)
1
=
b
a+ b
, ρ˜2 =
ψ
(4)
1
ψ
(4)
−1 + ψ
(4)
1
=
a
a+ b
.
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Now, we provide a long-run economic growth ratio of the dishonest mining pool com-
pared to the honest mining pool through using per unit net mining rate. We define
ℑ =
1
α˜+γRD (4)
1
β−γRH (4)
=
β − γ
α˜+ γ
RD (4)
RH (4)
.
A conjecture: We can deduce two basic results: (a) ℑ > 1 under the two conditions:
ℜ > 0, and rB + rF is larger. (b) the long-run ratio ℑ increases as the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ increases.
In the remainder of this section, by comparing our Figure 9 with Figure 1 of Eyal and
Sirer[23], we provide some useful remarks for understanding the Markov chain (Figure 1)
of Eyal and Sirer[23] as follows:
(a) Do there exist the two boundary states 0 and 0′?
In Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23], the two boundary states 0 and 0′ are introduced in
a strange way which is not easy to be understood. From (c) of Figures 8 and 9 in this
paper, we establish an approximate Markov process with a black-box state (0, 0). From a
PH distribution of infinite sizes, it is easy to see that the sojourn time at the black-box
state (0, 0) is non-exponential. On the other hand, it is observed that our black-box state
(0, 0) corresponds to state 0 of Eyal and Sirer [23]; while our state 0 (i.,e., 0 = k − k
for k ≥ 2) becomes state 0′ of Eyal and Sirer [23]. However, we don’t know in any way
how to set up states 0 and 0′ of Eyal and Sirer [23] by using theory of Markov processes.
Therefore, there do not exist such two boundary states 0 and 0′ from theory of Markov
processes, that is, the two boundary states 0 and 0′ are subjectively imaginary in Eyal
and Sirer [23].
(b) can the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ play a necessary role in the revenue
analysis?
In Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23], it is seen that 1 is the state transition probability
from state 0′ to state 0. However, the probability 1 is decomposed into three parts (or
separated path-probabilities): α, γ (1− α) and (1− γ) (1− α) by using 1 = α+γ (1− α)+
(1− γ) (1− α). Although the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ is introduced, the Markov
chain (Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23]) is independent of the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter
γ, for example, the stationary probability vector has nothing to do with the Eyal and
Sirer’s parameter γ. Furthermore, the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ is used in the revenue
analysis, see (1), (2) and (3) of Eyal and Sirer [23]. Clearly, their revenue computation is
based on the law of total probability, where from Eyal and Sirer [23], its event probabilities
55
are determined by using the Markov chain (Figure 1), and its event revenue is derived in
(1) and (2) by means of discussing those reward cases from (a) to (h). Since the stationary
probability vector of the Markov chain (Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23]) is independent of
the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ, the selfish mining pool’s revenue function ((1) to (3) of
Eyal and Sirer [23]) can linearly depend on the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ only from its
event revenue. On the other hand, from Sections 7 and 8 of this paper, it is easy to see
that the selfish mining pool’s revenue function ((3) of Eyal and Sirer [23]) is not based on
a rigorously mathematical calculation by using the Markov reward processes. Therefore,
the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter γ will not play any role in the revenue analysis under a
rigorously mathematical setting.
(c) States k for k ≥ 2 can not exists in Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23].
From Figure 9 of this paper, it is easy to see that there do not exist states 2, 3, 4, . . .,
unless introducting a block-detained probability sequence {pk : k = 2, 3, 4, . . .}. Therefore,
there can not exist the Markov chain (Figure 1 of Eyal and Sirer [23]) in the blockchain
selfish mining. Here, we explain what the Markov chain of Eyal and Sirer [23] should be
in reality.
In brief, one of our main findings demonstrates that the Markov chain and the revenue
analysis in Eyal and Sirer[23] should be confused. This paper provide some new insights
on improving the method of Eyal and Sirer [23] and those works having followed Eyal and
Sirer [23] in the literature.
9 Numerical Examples
In this section. we use some numerical examples to verify our theoretical results, and
indicate how performance measures of the blockchain selfish mining depend on some key
parameters of blockchain.
Our numerical experiments are classified as three parts: (a) The orphan blocks, (b) the
long-run average profits, and (c) an approximate computational model without network
latency.
Part one: The orphan blocks
To study the orphan blocks, we take some parameters: α˜ = 10, β = 28, the block-
pegged rate µ = 3. Let the jumping’s mining rate γ ∈ [0.5, 8.5], and the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9.
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To numerically discuss the average stationary lengths LM and LO of the main chain
and the chain of orphan blocks, Figure 10 shows that LM and LO are not monotonous for
γ or ℜ, and they start to decrease and then increase as γ or ℜ increases. Such theoretical
analysis is given in the end of Section 4.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
L
M
1=0.5
2=0.7
3=0.9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
L
O
1=0.5
2=0.7
3=0.9
Figure 10: LM and LO vs. γ for three different ℜ1, ℜ2, ℜ3.
Now, we observe the ratio φ of two average stationary lengths, and the stationary ratio
ψ of two block-passing-network rates. From Figure 11, it is seen that 0 < φ < ψ < 1.
Also, φ and ψ begin to increase and then decrease, as γ increases. Thus φ and ψ are not
monotonous for γ or ℜ. In fact, we can’t instructively characterize each of φ and ψ duo
to their complicated expressions.
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Figure 11: φ and ψ vs. γ for three different ℜ1, ℜ2, ℜ3.
Part two: The long-run average profits
To discuss the long-run average profits, we take some parameters: α˜ = 10, β = 28,
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the block-pegged rate µ = 3, rB = 0.5, rF = 0.5, cE = 0.5, cA = 0.5. Let the jumping’s
mining rate γ ∈ [5, 8.5], and the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9.
From the left half of Figure 12, it is seen that the long-run average profit RH of the
honest mining pool decreases as the jumping’s mining rate γ increase, and it also decreases
as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases. While from the right half of Figure 12, it is
observe that the long-run average profit RD of the dishonest mining pool increases as the
jumping’s mining rate γ increase, and it also increases as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ
increases.
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Figure 12: RH and RD vs. γ for three different ℜ1, ℜ2, ℜ3.
Now, we discuss the long-run economic growth ratio ℑ of the dishonest mining pool
compared to the honest mining pool, and the long-run blockchain-pegged growth ratio
τ of the dishonest mining pool compared to the honest mining pool. The two long-run
ratios are necessary and useful in the study of blockchain selfish mining.
From the the left half of Figure 13, it is seen that ℑ > 1. Furthermore, ℑ increases
as the jumping’s mining rate γ increases, and it also increases as the efficiency-increased
ratio ℜ increases.
From the right half of Figure 13, it is seen that τ > 1. Moreover, τ increases as the
jumping’s mining rate γ increase, and it also increases as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ
increases.
Corollary 15 shows that each of the two long-run ratios ℑ and τ increases, as the
effiency-increased ratio ℜ increases. This is the same as our numerical experiment. How-
ever, we can not prove that the two long-run ratios ℑ and τ are monotonically increasing
for the jumping’s mining rate γ, because ℑ and τ have a complicated relation with re-
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spect to γ. While it is interesting that our numerical experiment indicates such increasing
monotonicity. This demonstrates that the bigger the selfish pool, the more profit each
selfish miner will make. Therefore, the selfish pool has a real incentive motivation such
that it becomes bigger and bigger.
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Figure 13: ℑ and τ vs. γ for three different ℜ1, ℜ2, ℜ3.
Part three: The approximate computational model without network la-
tency
In the approximate computational model without network latency, we take some pa-
rameters: α˜ = 10, β = 28, the block-pegged rate µ = 3, rB = 15, rF = 3, cE = 3, cA = 1.
Let the jumping’s mining rate γ ∈ [0.5, 8], the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.9.
We first analyze the relative long-run average profit R
(∞)
H (3) of the honest mining
pool. From the left half of Figure 14, it is seen that R
(∞)
H (3) decreases as the jumping’s
mining rate γ increases, and it also decreases as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases.
Then we discuss the relative long-run average profit R
(∞)
D (3) of the dishonest mining
pool. From the right half of Figure 14, it is seen that R
(∞)
D (3) increases as the jumping’s
mining rate γ increase, and it also increases as the efficiency-increased ratio ℜ increases.
Note that the precise long-run average profit RH and the relative long-run average
profit R
(∞)
H (3) have a similar monotonicity, but RH is smaller than R
(∞)
H (3). Also, so are
RD and R
(∞)
D (3).
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10 Relevant Literature
In this section, we provide a detailed literature for the blockchain selfish mining in the
last ten years, including two basic parts: Advances in the blockchain selfish mining; and
a brief introduction to the PoW and consensus protocols.
Since the seminal Bitcoin paper by Nakamoto [71], blockchain has received high at-
tention on not only theoretical research but also practical applications. Readers may refer
to two textbooks by Narayanan et al. [72] and Hofmann et al. [38] for a fundamental
introduction to blockchain; and survey papers by, such as Morhaim [67], Babich and Hi-
lary [2], Li et al. [58], Wang et al. [90] and Natoli et al. [73]. On the other hand, the
applicability of blockchain is rapidly growing in a wide range of practical areas including
finance, pharmacy, health care, smart energy, reputation systems, security management,
Internet of Things, sharing economy, supply chain management, corporate governance and
so on.
Blockchain is a tandem system composed of a series of blocks (e.g., see Li et al. [57, 58]),
and records a lot of transactions by using block by block. In such a blockchain, the first
block is called genesis block which is a key part of the frequently-used consensus protocol:
PoW. The subsequent blocks are orderly built from the genesis block through solving the
PoW cryptographic puzzles in order to be able to find a nonce of every block, that is, the
nonce is a solution to the PoW cryptographic puzzle. Normally, each block contains the
hash value of the previous block (called parent block), a Merkle tree, some timestamps, and
a nonce. Note that the nonce is a random number and plays a key role in verifying the
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hash of blockchain, thus the process of solving the cryptographic puzzle is called mining,
and the participants of blockchain mining are called miners. The cryptographic puzzle is
a double-hash whose result has to be smaller than a positive real number, called difficulty
level (or target), which determines the puzzle hardness. In general, the difficulty level can
be dynamically adjusted such that generating the blocks can be controlled at an average
rate of one every ten minutes. On the other hand, every block can be managed by only
one miner who can provide the nonce. If so, this miner can receive two parts of profits:
The block reward and the transaction fee. Under such a profit incentive, the miner is
willing to compete in producing and broadcasting blocks in an open P2P network, and
hope to peg the blocks on the blockchain such that he can receive the block reward and
the transaction fee as much as possible.
If the electricity price is low and the profit of mining each block is relatively high,
then more and more people are willing to join the mining process under the lure of such
a handsome profit. Note that the total number of generating blocks is controlled at
an average rate of one every ten minutes, thus as the number of miners increases, the
probability of individual miner who can generate a block becomes lower and lower. This
greatly increases the mining risk of the individual miner. To reduce such a mining risk,
some miners have to (or like) form a mining pool. So far vigorously developing such mining
pools has become increasingly widespread. Figure 1 introduces the 10 best and biggest
Bitcoin mining pools in the world in 2020. Also see Lee and Kim [51] for some detailed
explanation.
10.1 Advances in blockchain selfish mining
Now, it is necessary to summarize the latest research directions in the selfish mining of
blockchain, and to explain the important methodologies adopted and the foundational
results obtained in these researches.
The selfish mining by Eyal and Sirer [23]. In 2014, Eyal and Sirer [23] (nearly at
the same time, Bahack [3]) introduced selfish mining in the presence of multiple multiple
pools (or miners). For a blockchain with two mining pools, Eyal and Sirer [23] set up
a simple Markov chain to express dynamic behavior of selfish mining, and designed a
subjective reward structure with respect to diverse evolution of two forked block branches.
They provided a fairly simple revenue analysis of the selfish mining. Based on this, they
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Figure 15: The 10 best and biggest Bitcoin mining pools in the world in 2020
obtained several unimaginably interesting properties of the Bitcoin (or blockchain) as a
practical profitable thrill.
A class of simple Markov chains following Eyal and Sirer [23]. Following the simple
Markov chain given by Eyal and Sirer [23], some researchers have further extended and
generalized to discuss other attack strategies of blockchain either from multiple mining
pools or from Ethereum (and smart contract), among which important examples include
stubborn mining by Nayak et al. [74], Wang et al. [91] and Liu et al. [62]; Ethereum (and
smart contract) by Niu and Feng [77]; multiple mining pools (or miners) by Leelavimolsilp
et al. [54, 53], Liu et al. [60] and Jain [39]; multi-stage blockchain by Chang et al. [13]; no
block reward by Carlsten et al. [12]; Power adjusting by Gao et al. [25]; extending Eyal
and Sirer’s Markov chain by Gervais et al. [30], Mwale [70], Moustapha [68], Mulser [69],
Bai et al. [4], Marmolejo-Coss´ıo et al. [65], Dong et al. [20], Lee and Kim [51] and Liu et
al. [61].
Two-dimensional Markov chains. Differently from Eyal and Sirer’s method, Go˝bel
et al. [31] set up a new two-dimensional Markov chain to study the selfish mining, and
also provided an interpretation on the Eyal and Sirer’s parameter. Javier and Fralix [41]
further provided a new mathematical derivation for the stationary probability vector of the
two-dimensional Markov chain given in Go˝bel et al. [31]. In this paper, we generalize the
two-dimensional Markov chain from not only a two-block leading competitive criterion but
also an economic incentive mechanism, and show that the stationary probability vector is
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a new matrix-geometric solution with an explicitly representable rate matrix
Theory of martingale. Grunspan and Pe´rez-Marco [32, 33, 34, 35] applied martingale to
analyze the profitability of selfish mining, stubborn mining, trailing mining, and Ethereum.
Markov decision process. To dynamically optimize the selfish mining strategy, the
Markov decision processes can be applied to the study of blockchain selfish mining. Im-
portant examples include Sapirshtein et al. [82], Sompolinsky and Zohar [86], Gervais et
al. [29], Wu¨st [95] and Gupta [37].
Generalizing selfish mining. To generalize the blockchain selfish mining, Courtois and
Bahack [17] proposed a subversive miner strategy, Nayak et al. [74] presented a stubborn
mining strategy, and Lee and Kim [53] developed a detective mining by means of the
information of miners.
The puzzle difficulty. The Bitcoin miners have competitively solved a computationally
hard puzzle (i.e., PoW puzzle) to find the nonce of every block. Once such a nonce is
solved, a Bitcoin block can immediately be generated and pegged on the blockchain. As
seen in Nakamoto [71], Narayanan et al. [72], Miller et al. [66], Go˝bel et al. [31], Kraft
[49] and Davidson and Diamond [18]. The difficulty level used to discover a new block
can be constantly adjusted such that, on average, one block is expected to be discovered
every 10 minutes. In other words, the difficulty level must be updated every 2016 blocks
or every 14 days. If 2016 blocks are discovered in a shorter time, then the difficulty level
will be increased; while if they are generated in a longer time, then the difficulty level will
be decreased.
In the blockchain selfish mining, the difficulty level of PoW puzzle is updated accord-
ing to the number of blocks pegged on the blockchain; while some orphan blocks are
simultaneously produced, but they are not counted in updating the difficulty level of PoW
puzzle. For the puzzle difficulty of the blockchain selfish mining, readers may refer to, such
as block arrivals by Go˝bel et al. [31]; zeroblock by Solat and Potop-Butucaru [84, 83];
smartpool by Luu et al. [64]; difficulty control by Fullmer and Morse [24]; pooled mining
by Lee and Kim [51]; unfairness of blockchain by Guerraoui and Wang [36]; multi-stage
blockchain by Chang et al. [13]; bobtail by Bissias and Levine [7]; and so on.
Forked structure. (a) If the blockchain contains only two mining pools (one honest
mining pool while another dishonest mining pool), then the forked structure is formed
as two block branches forked at a common tree root, so that the longer block branch is
called the main chain, and another is taked as the chain of orphan blocks. See Section
63
4 of Eyal and Sirer [23] for more details. In this case, the main chain is taken by using
the longest chain rule, which can be used to deal with multiple block branches forked at a
common tree root. (b) If the blockchain has at least three mining pools, Sompolinsky and
Zohar [86] showed that the forked structure is a more general tree with multiple branching
points (GHOST), in which the main chain selection algorithm is taken as the heaviest path.
Also see Eyal et al. [22] and Lewenberg et al. [55] for more details. More generally, to
improve scalability and transaction throughput of blockchain, Kiayias and Panagiotakos
[47] showed that the selfish mining can form the blockchain by means of a Direct Acyclic
Graph (abbreviated DAG). Further research includes Lee [50], Choi et al. [16] and so
forth.
Multiple mining pools (or miners). So far few works have investigated the PoW
blockchain with multiple mining pools, e.g., see Leelavimolsilp et al. [52, 51], Liu et
al. [60] and Jain [39].
Orphan blocks and uncle blocks. In the blockchain selfish mining, the orphan blocks
and uncle blocks are related to the waste of computing power resource by means of the
longest chain or heaviest path. Readers may refer to the orphan blocks by Carlsten et al.
[12], Velner et al. [89], Stifter et al. [87], Saad et al. [81] and Awe et al. [1]; and the uncle
blocks (in Ethereum) by Gervais et al. [29], Ritz and Zugenmaier [78], Niu and Feng [77],
Werner et al. [92], Wang et al. [91], Chang et al. [14] and Liu et al. [62].
Detection of selfish mining. In a blockchain, it is possible to have some different
classes of attacks, such as 51% attack, selfish mining attack, stalker attack, eclipse attack,
physical attack and so forth. In this case, an interesting topic is how to detect the different
attacks effectively such that we can put forward some defensive measures for the attacks.
Important examples include Liu et al. [63], Saad et al. [80], Lee and Kim [52] and
Chicarino et al. [15].
Defense against selfish mining. The selfish mining attack is a fundamental challenge
in the study of blockchain, since it breaks the fairness of blockchain (see Guerraoui and
Wang [36]) and poses potential threats to the decentralized structure. Thus it is very
important to defense against and prevent the selfish mining, readers may refer to, such as
Zhang [97], Solat and Potop-Butucaru [83, 84] and Zhang and Preneel [98].
Data and experiment analysis. Other research work needs to be mentioned, for ex-
ample, Wright [93], Wright and Savanah [94], Eijkel and Fehnker [21] and Kedziora et al.
[44].
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Double spending attacks. The double spending attacks have a stronger relation with
the selfish mining. Note that the block-pegged time can increase due to the network
delay (see Decker and Wattenhofer [19]), thus the released blocks will not be confirmed
immediately. In this situation, the selfish mining attacks can make the double spending
attacks, e.g., see Karame et al. [43], Rosenfeld [79] and Javarone and Wright [40] for more
details.
10.2 A simple introduction to consensus protocols
To study the blockchain selfish mining systematically, it is necessary and useful to provide
a simple introduction to the PoW and further to the consensus protocols.
Proof of Work. Garay et al. [26] discussed the bitcoin backbone protocol and formally
proved that Bitcoin PoW is a consensus protocol. For the PoW in blockchain, readers may
refer to, such as Bastiaan [6], Tromp [88], Garay et al. [27, 28], Kiayias et al. [45, 46],
Kiayias and Zindros [48] and Karakostas and Kiayias [42].
Consensus protocols. So far the consensus protocols (or algorithms) have been the
core of blockchain development. Normally, the consensus protocol is used to determine
the generation, storage and validation of data, it sets up operations mode of blockchain and
determines performance and security of blockchain. Now, the frequently used consensus
protocols include two different types: A consensus protocol based on Byzantine fault
tolerance algorithm (BFT), and another consensus protocol based on PoW / Proof of
Stake (PoS). The BFT consensus protocol is usually used in smaller private chains or
alliance chains; while the PoW/PoS consensus protocol is suitable for large-scale public
chains. Furthermore, following BFT, PoW and PoS, so far over fifty consensus protocols
have been developed with advantage of special needs. Readers may refer to survey papers
by, for example, Bissias et al. [8], Cachin et al. [11], Nguyen and Kim [76], Wang et al.
[90], Xiao et al. [96], Bano et al. [5] and Natoli et al. [73].
11 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we provide a new theoretical framework of pyramid Markov processes in
the study of blockchain selfish mining. To do so, we describe a more general blockchain
selfish mining with both a two-block leading competitive criterion and a new economic
incentive, both of which are expressed by means of a block-detained probability sequence,
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the efficiency-increased ratio, and the mining rate of jumping miners to the dishonest
mining pool. For such a selfish mining, we establish a pyramid Markov process, and
show that the pyramid Markov process must be stable and so is the blockchain, and
its stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric with an explicitly representable rate
matrix. At the same time, we use the stationary probability vector to analyze the orphan
(or stale) blocks. Furthermore, we set up a pyramid Markov reward process to investigate
the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. Based
on this, we can measure the mining efficiency of the dishonest mining pool comparing to
the honest mining pool. As a by-product, we build three approximative Markov (reward)
processes related to the pyramid Markov (reward) process when the system states are
described as the block-number difference of two forked branches. Also, for a special case
with non network latency, one of our main findings demonstrates that the simple Markov
chain and the subjective reward structure by Eyal and Sirer [23] should be incorrect, so
that those obtained results due to following the method of Eyal and Sirer [23] in the
literature are no longer true. Finally, we use some numerical examples to verify our
theoretical results.
Note that the pyramid Markov (reward) processes open a new avenue to the study of
blockchain selfish mining, thus we hope that the methodology and results developed in
this paper can shed light to the blockchain selfish mining and open a series of potentially
promising research. Along these lines, we will continue our future research on the following
directions:
– Considering the blockchain selfish mining under a variable difficulty level of PoW
puzzle, which is described as a Markovian arrival process, or a transient periodic point
process.
– Analyzing the case that a part of the main chain by the dishonest mining pool is
pegged on the blockchain, while the other part of the main chain is left to support the
next round of competition between two new block branches forked at a tree root. Note
that the other part of the main chain by the dishonest mining pool is possible to become
the orphan blocks if its subsequent new branch is no longer ahead of that by the honest
mining pool. This is a significant risk for how the dishonest mining pool pegs its main
chain on the blockchain, for example, the whole to peg, or a part to peg.
– Discussing the case with aK-block leading competitive criterion forK = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . .,
and optimize the positive integer K to maximize the mining efficiency and/or the long-run
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average profit.
– Setting up a pyramid block-structure Markov process for Ethereum, and develop
an effective algorithm for computing the matrix-analytic solution. Using the stationary
probability vector to analyze the orphan and uncle blocks, and further investigate the
long-run average profits.
– Developing the fluid and diffusion approximation for analyzing the blockchain selfish
mining with multiple mining pools, provide the stable conditions of the multi-dimensional
blockchain systems, and establish the long-run average profits of the multiple mining pools.
– Further developing stochastic optimization and dynamic control of the blockchain
selfish mining, for example, Markov decision processes, stochastic game, and evolutionary
game.
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